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The evolution of benefit-sharing:  
linking biodiversity and community livelihoods 
 
Elisa Morgera and Elsa Tsioumani 
 
This article traces the evolution of the use of the legal concept of benefit-sharing in 
the context of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), with a view to 
highlighting its contribution to indigenous and local communities’ livelihoods. To this 
end, the article proposes a distinction between inter-State benefit-sharing (as 
identified in the third CBD objective and as usually linked to access to genetic 
resources), and notably lesser known State-to-community benefit-sharing (in relation 
to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity). The article highlights the 
different legal connotations of the two dimensions of this legal concept, while 
supporting an integrated interpretation of the CBD by pointing to a wide array of 
benefit-sharing related tools under the Convention that can be used to support 
indigenous and local communities’ livelihoods in pursuing the Convention’s three 
objectives. The article also identifies other international processes – in the areas of 
intellectual property, health and climate change – in which, these conceptual 
developments may have a significant influence. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been a significant evolution of the use of the legal concept of benefit-
sharing in the context of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its 
contribution to indigenous and local communities’ livelihoods. In particular, 
according to the text of the Convention and the decisions of its Conference of the 
Parties (COP),1 the concept of benefit-sharing has been evolving not only in relation 
to the use of genetic resources, but also, with remarkably different legal connotations, 
to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Accordingly, this leads to 
distinguishing inter-State benefit-sharing2 from State-to-community benefit-sharing. 
 
The text of the CBD refers prominently to benefit-sharing as its third objective in 
Article 1 (Objectives): ‘the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the 
utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources 
and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights 
over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding.’ In this 
instance, benefit-sharing is tied to the use of genetic resources and embodies an inter-
State approach to achieve sustainable development and equity.3 The first part of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992). On the question of the legal 
significance of COP decisions, see J. Brunnée, ‘COPing with Consent: Law-making under Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements’ 15:1 Leiden Journal of International Law (2002) 1; and T. Gehring, 
‘Treaty-making and Treaty Evolution’, in D. Bodanski, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), 467, at 491-495. 
2 The inter-State dimension was stressed in D. Shelton, ‘Fair Play, Fair Pay: Preserving Traditional 
Knowledge and Biological Resources’ 5 Yearbook of International Environmental Law (1994), 76, at 
83. 
3 For a discussion of the legal concept of equity and its specific application in the context of the fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing, see F. Francioni, ‘Equity’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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article will discuss the extent to which inter-State benefit-sharing can contribute to 
communities’ livelihoods, exploring relevant discussions in the context of 
negotiations on access and benefit-sharing (ABS) under the CBD, and addressing also 
the relevant provisions of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture (ITPGR).4  
  
On the other hand, another key provision of the CBD envisages a qualitatively 
different concept of benefit-sharing as a State-to-community contribution to 
sustainable development and equity. CBD Article 8(j), with a significantly qualified 
formulation, calls on Parties to encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
from the utilization of the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and 
local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity (thus, with a specific reference to the first and 
second objectives of the Convention).5 In this case, benefit-sharing envisages the 
establishment of a relationship between the community and the State in which the 
community resides, on the basis of national legislation.6  
 
Interestingly, the implications of Article 8(j) have so far been mostly discussed in the 
context of the use of genetic resources and/or associated traditional knowledge, and 
specifically the negotiations on an international ABS regime.7 Thus, it is common 
usage to refer to benefit-sharing almost exclusively in the context of ‘ABS’ and the 
third objective of the Convention. Such common usage, however, does not take into 
account the fact that significant developments under the CBD specifically related to 
the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity have made recourse to the 
concept of benefit-sharing without any connection to access to or use of genetic 
resources. These developments embody specific applications of State-to-community 
benefit-sharing, rather than the inter-State concept of benefit-sharing used in the ABS 
context. The second part of this article will thus analyze the references to benefit-
sharing in a multitude of decisions adopted by the COP in the context of the CBD’s 
first and second objectives, with a view to elucidating its State-to-community 
dimension. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Rome, 3 November 2001). 
5 CBD Article 1 refers to ‘the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its 
componens.’ It should be noted, however, that the text of the Convention refers inconsistently to the 
sustainable use of ‘biodiversity’ or of ‘biological resources’: see S. Johnston, ‘Sustainability, 
Biodiversity and International Law’, in M Bowman and C Redgwell, International Law and the 
Conservation of Biological Diversity (Kluwer Law International, 1996) 51-70, at 56. 
6 Subjecting compliance with international law as expressed in the CBD to national law was considered 
unusual at the time of the Convention’s adoption but has become a common feature in the development 
of soft law under the CBD. This type of reference to national law seems to point to the need to preserve 
the legal relationship between a State and the indigenous peoples within its territory based on pre-
existing, but possibly also future, national law. See L. Glowka et al., A Guide to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 30 (IUCN, 1994). 
7 Following the call of the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development to negotiate, within the 
CBD framework, an international regime to promote and safeguard the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources (Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (UN. 
Doc. A/CONF.199/20, 4 September 2002), Resolution 2, Annex, para 44(o) (JPOI)), the seventh 
Conference of the Parties to the CBD mandated the CBD Working Group on ABS to negotiate an 
international regime on ABS. Discussions on the international ABS regime also dominated 
negotiations at the CBD Working Group on Article 8(j) and related provisions. See recently, C. 
Chiarolla, et al.,‘Summary of the sixth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Intersessional Working 
Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the CBD, 2-6 November 2009’, 9:482 Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin (9 November 2009).  
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Both Parts II and III of the article will also cursorily refer to relevant national 
legislation reflecting the two dimensions of benefit-sharing. Although a thorough 
analysis of State practice in this respect is beyond the scope of this article, it seems 
particularly relevant to point to the need to assess the impacts of these developments 
at the national level, with a view to assessing the effective contribution of the CBD to 
communities’ livelihoods.8  
 
Furthermore, this article aims to highlight that benefit-sharing is also relevant in the 
context of other international instruments. Even before the adoption of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, for instance, the Declaration on the Right to 
Development recognized that States have ‘the right and the duty to formulate 
appropriate national development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the 
well-being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, 
free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the 
benefits resulting therefrom.’9 Since then, and mostly prompted by developments in 
the context of the CBD, several other international instruments and processes have 
resorted to this concept. The third part of this article will therefore identify ongoing 
international efforts in this direction, in the areas of intellectual property, health and 
climate change. Within these related international processes, benefit-sharing may play 
a significant role either as an inter-State or State-to-community instrument for 
sustainable development and equity, particularly as a contribution to communities’ 
livelihoods.  
 
In its conclusions, this article will provide an initial assessment of the evolution of the 
concept of benefit-sharing vis-à-vis the global goal of significantly reducing 
biodiversity loss as a contribution to poverty alleviation and to the benefit of all life 
on Earth, that the Parties to the CBD10 and the broader international community11 had 
set for themselves for 2010. It will also highlight the importance of a holistic 
approach to the legal interpretation and implementation of the different concepts of 
benefit-sharing under the Convention. 
 
II. INTER-STATE BENEFIT-SHARING  
 
In addressing inter-State benefit-sharing, the evolution of principles of ownership of 
genetic resources and particularly the principle of national sovereignty, as enshrined 
in the CBD, will be discussed first. Following a brief review of regulatory 
developments regarding several CBD provisions linked to inter-State benefit-sharing, 
attention will be focused on benefit-sharing tied to the use of genetic resources as in 
Article 15, to examine whether, under which conditions and to what extent such 
benefits can be realized, reach communities and contribute to their livelihoods. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See discussion on the need to assess the effective contribution of the CBD against implementation in 
P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Oxford University 
Press, 2009), at 617. 
9 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development (A/RES/41/128, 4 December 1986), 
Article 2(3) [emphasis added].  
10 CBD COP 6 Decision VI/26, Strategic Plan for the Convention on Biological Diversity (27 May 
2002) para. 11. 
11 This target was subsequently endorsed by the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, n. 7 above, para. 44), and the United Nations General 
Assembly (2005 World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60.1, 24 October 2005), para. 56). 
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will be then compared with the Multilateral System of the International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture as a multilateral approach to inter-
State benefit-sharing in the specific domain of agricultural biodiversity. 
 
The evolution of principles of ownership of genetic resources 
 
Until negotiation and entry into force of the CBD, an arguable application of the 
concept of common heritage of mankind12 over natural/biological resources had 
resulted in an almost free flow of genetic resources across boundaries.13 Access to in 
situ resources was legitimately free and unconditional, and the results of research on 
such resources were expected to benefit future generations. Accordingly, the non-
binding International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture was adopted by the FAO Conference in 198314 to ensure that ‘plant 
genetic resources of economic and/or social interest, particularly for agriculture, will 
be explored, preserved, evaluated and made available for plant breeding and scientific 
purposes,’ based on the ‘universally accepted principle that plant genetic resources 
are a heritage of mankind and consequently should be available without restriction.’15 
 
Already at the time of adoption of the International Undertaking, some developed 
countries were reluctant to allow the principle of common heritage to apply to their 
modern crop varieties, due to possible implications for intellectual property 
protection.16 Dating from 1961, the International Convention for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention) has been promoting a system of private 
ownership over new plant varieties through sui generis intellectual property rights 
(plant breeders’ rights) ‘with the aim of encouraging the development of new varieties 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This understanding should be compared with the common heritage regime, as provided for in 
Article 140(2) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Montego Bay, 10 December 
1982), which has been described as encompassing four basic elements: resources that cannot be 
appropriated to the exclusive sovereignty of States; resources that must be conserved and exploited for 
the benefit of mankind, without discrimination; an international institution to manage and regulate 
these activities; and the peaceful purposes of these activities. The second element basically provides for 
all States to share rewards, even if they are unable to participate in the actual process of extraction, in 
the framework of international regulation of access and benefit-sharing. See P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. 
Redgwell, n. 8 above, at 128-130 and 197.  
13 See M.W. Tvedt and T. Young, Beyond Access: Exploring Implementation of the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing Commitment in the CBD, IUCN ABS Series No. 2 (IUCN, 2007), at 1.  
14 In general, international instruments have employed the term ‘common heritage’ to non-living 
resources, with two apparent exceptions: the FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic 
Resources (FAO Resolution 8/83, 23 November 1983) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 27 June 1981), which proclaims, in Article 22, that ‘All 
people shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development ... and in the equal 
enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind,’ without providing further details. See G. Maggio and 
O. J. Lynch, Human Rights, Environment and Economic Development: Existing and Emerging 
Standards in International Law and Global Society (Center for International Environmental Law, 15 
November 1997), at Part IV, found at <http://www.ciel.org/Publications/olpaper3.html>.  
15 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, ibid., Article 1.  
‘Agreed interpretation of the International Undertaking’ (FAO Resolution 4/89, 29 November 1989) 
clarified that ‘plant genetic resources are a common heritage of mankind to be preserved, and to be 
freely available for use, for the benefit of present and future generations.’ See E. Tsioumani 
‘International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: Legal and Policy Questions 
from Adoption to Implementation’, 14 Yearbook of International Environmental Law (2004), 121.  
16 Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States signed the Undertaking with reservations. 
5  
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of plants for the benefit of society.’17 The combination of genetic resources and 
biotechnology has led to growing expectations of benefits from the commercial value 
of biodiversity from the part of developing nations, the main holders of the planet’s 
biodiversity. At the same time, intellectual property protection has led to 
asymmetries, and a sense of unfairness among developing countries. For instance, as a 
result of the novelty requirement of intellectual property protection, traditional and 
farmers’ crop varieties have been regarded as ‘prior art’ within the public domain, 
while modern varieties are often patentable. Developing countries realized that their 
germplasm could be acquired and shared freely to be used in the development of 
modern varieties, which would then be protected by exclusive property rights, raising 
concern regarding the implications for their development opportunities and a strong 
interest to gain recognition and share in commercial and other benefits. 
 
Against this background, the principle of national sovereignty over genetic resources 
as enshrined in the CBD has replaced the International Undertaking’s statements 
regarding common heritage concepts. Aiming to correct prior asymmetries by 
subjecting access to genetic resources to the prior informed consent of the State party 
providing those resources and to the sharing of the benefits arising from their 
commercial or other utilization, the principle of national sovereignty provided a clear 
legal basis for inter-State benefit-sharing as enshrined in the third CBD objective. At 
the same time, the Convention reflected and encouraged expectations that ‘there 
would soon be a substantial market for biodiversity, the benefits of which would flow 
to developing countries.’18 
 
Inter-State benefit-sharing in the CBD 
 
Against this background, the third CBD objective was shaped, with benefit-sharing at 
the heart of the political agreement being conceived both as an economic incentive for 
the developing world to conserve biodiversity,19 as well as a means to correct 
injustices by promoting equity.20 Placing an obligation on developed countries to 
share the benefits arising from genetic resource utilization made the CBD not only a 
conservation agreement, but also one targeting sustainable development and justice. It 
has been argued that benefits from biodiversity use were expected not simply to 
finance conservation objectives; they would also contribute to the sustainable 
development of countries of origin in general, and eventually to the livelihoods of 
indigenous and local communities traditionally holding the resources and associated 
knowledge.21  
 
The language of the third CBD objective seems to point to three means of sharing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (Paris, 2 December 1961), 
Mission Statement.  
18 M. Petit et al., Why Governments Can’t Make Policy: The Case of Plant Genetic Resources in the 
International Arena (International Potato Center, 2001), at 8. 
19 G. Verhoosel, ‘Prospective for Marine and Coastal Biodiversity: International Law in Deep Water’ 
13:1 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (1998), 91, at 97. 
20 See M.W. Tvedt and T. Young, n. 13 above, at 75-98. 
21 For discussion of the potential contribution of ABS to development, see W. Reid et al., Biodiversity 
Prospecting: Using Genetic Resources for Sustainable Development (World Resources Institute, 
1993); and R. Wynberg and S. Laird, ‘Bioprospecting, Access and Benefit Sharing: Revisiting the 
‘Grand Bargain’’ in R. Wynberg et al. (eds) Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Benefit-Sharing: 
Lessons from the San Hoodia Case (Springer, 2009), 69. 
6  
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benefits,22 each underpinned by specific provisions of the Convention: appropriate 
access to genetic resources (addressed in Article 15); appropriate transfer of relevant 
technologies (Article 16), including biotechnology (addressed in Article 19); and 
appropriate funding (addressed in Articles 20 and 21). Although deliberations 
regarding the implementation challenges tied to these provisions have taken different 
tracks under the Convention, they all refer to inter-State benefit-sharing, generally 
leaving considerable discretion to the Party concerned.  
 
As an important means to meet the third CBD objective, Article 16 defines the basic 
obligations of each Party regarding technology transfer, the basis of transfer to 
developing countries and what measures are to be taken to institute the transfers 
contemplated.23 This complex article makes particular reference to access to and 
transfer of technology that uses genetic resources to the developing countries which 
have provided such genetic resources.24 In addition, according to Article 19, Parties 
should promote and advance priority access to the results and benefits arising from 
modern biotechnologies to, and ensure participation in biotechnological research by, 
Parties that provide the genetic resources for such research. A programme of work on 
technology transfer and scientific and technological cooperation was adopted in 2004, 
providing concrete guidance on activities needed, including on the establishment of 
enabling environments for technology transfer in providing and receiving countries.25 
It provides a specific example of work towards achieving inter-State benefit-sharing, 
despite the fact that technologies to be transferred may be owned by the private sector 
and its collaboration is required: governments are called upon to create an 
institutional, administrative, legislative and policy environment conducive to private 
and public sector technology transfer and to the adaptation of transferred technology, 
or to remove barriers to technology transfer inconsistent with international law.  
 
Article 20 considers national and international responsibilities for financing action 
mandated by the Convention, including the obligation of developed countries to 
provide new and additional financial resources to developing countries, while Article 
21 establishes a financial mechanism for the provision of financial resources to 
developing country Parties. While similar provisions can be found in other 
multilateral environmental agreements,26 it should be noted that in the context of the 
CBD, their implementation has specifically targeted objectives related to benefit-
sharing, among others. In fact, the Biodiversity focal area strategy and strategic 
programming for the fourth replenishment of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), 
which is the Convention’s financial mechanism,27 includes a strategic objective on 
building capacity on ABS, supporting governments in meeting their obligations under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See L. Glowka et al., n. 6 above, at 15. It should be noted that the text of CBD Article 1 does not 
include the cross-references to specific CBD Articles. 
23 Ibid., at 84.  
24 See CBD, n. 1 above, Article 16(3). 
25 Transfer of technology and technology cooperation (Articles 16 to 19) (CBD COP 7 Decision 
VII/29, 13 April 2004). 
26 See, for instance, Article 4(3) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York, 9 
May 1992). 
27 Mentioned as part of an interim financial arrangement in CBD Article 39, GEF has become the 
designated institutional structure operating the financial mechanism of the Convention through 
adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding at CBD COP 3. See Memorandum of understanding 
between the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Council of the 
Global Environment Facility (CBD Decision III/8, 11 February 1997). 
7  
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CBD Article 15. The objective includes a specific goal on ensuring fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing, while indicators include the amount of monetary and non-monetary 
benefits effectively shared with countries providing genetic resources, including 
countries of origin, and countries that have acquired the genetic resources in 
accordance with the Convention.28 Furthermore, the recently adopted Strategy for 
Resource Mobilization29 includes a goal on enhancing implementation of ABS 
initiatives, considering them a tool for generating financial returns to support 
conservation and sustainable use initiatives in provider countries. In finance-related 
soft law, therefore, inter-State benefit-sharing is seen as an objective to be achieved 
through implementing and funding ABS initiatives.  
 
Through years of CBD deliberations, the third CBD objective (benefit-sharing from 
the use of genetic resources) has been firmly linked in negotiations and academic 
literature with access to genetic resources, as ensuring access was generally seen as 
the pre-condition for continuing research and potentially realizing the benefits to be 
shared. However, it should be noted that the Convention language places greater 
emphasis on benefit-sharing, while access is presented as a subordinate concept. In 
that regard, it should be recalled that Article 1 refers to access to genetic resources as 
one potential means towards achieving benefit-sharing. Furthermore, and using 
clearly legally binding language, Article 15(7) deals specifically with inter-State 
benefit-sharing, calling upon Parties to take legislative, administrative or policy 
measures aiming to share the results of research and development, and the benefits 
arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the 
provider country, underscoring that such sharing of benefits must be based on 
mutually agreed terms (MAT).30 Notably, this requirement for national benefit-
sharing measures is not linked to access. The provisions of Article 15 do not include 
reference to access-related ‘measures’, with Article 15(2) stating, using less binding 
language, that Parties ‘shall endeavour to create conditions to facilitate access to 
genetic resources for environmentally sound uses … and not to impose restrictions 
that run counter to the objectives of this Convention’.   
 
Parties’ rights and obligations with regard to access are set out in Article 15(1-2) and 
15(4-5) reiterating the principle of national sovereignty over natural resources. They 
recognize that the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the 
national governments of provider countries, subject to national legislation, and 
provide that access, as well as benefit-sharing, must be based on MAT.31 Article 15 
further establishes a number of pre-conditions for access to become operational in 
inter-State relations on the basis of national legislation, including the prior informed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See GEF, ‘Biodiversity focal area strategy and strategic programming for GEF-4’, (GEF brochure, 
no document number, October 2007). However, few projects have been submitted under the strategic 
objective on capacity building on ABS. See the Intersessional work program submitted for GEF 
Council approval (GEF/IS/23, June 2010), at 1. 
29 Review of implementation of Articles 20 and 21 (CBD Decision IX/11, 9 October 2008).  
30 CBD, n. 1 above, Article 15(7) reads: ‘Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative 
or policy measures, as appropriate, and in accordance with Articles 16 and 19 and, where necessary, 
through the financial mechanism established by Articles 20 and 21 with the aim of sharing in a fair and 
equitable way the results of research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial 
and other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing such resources. Such 
sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms.’   
31 The Convention therefore establishes a contractual mechanism to facilitate the achievement of ABS 
obligations and objectives. See M.W. Tvedt and T. Young, n. 13 above, at 18. 
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consent (PIC) of the Party providing genetic resources.  
 
According to Article 15(7), benefits to be shared on MAT are not only research and 
development results, but also the commercial or other benefits derived from the 
utilization of the genetic resources provided. These benefits are recognized to also be 
governed by Articles 16 and 19 to include: access to and transfer of technology using 
the genetic resources; participation in biotechnological research activities; and priority 
access to the results and benefits arising from biotechnological use of the genetic 
resources. As a specific form of benefit-sharing and paralleling Article 18 on 
scientific and technical cooperation, Article 15(6) requires Parties to promote 
collaborative scientific research between provider and user Parties.32 
 
To implement the benefit-sharing requirement, countries that have or may have users 
within their respective jurisdictions need to adopt legislative, administrative or policy 
measures.33 As noted by Tvedt and Young, this means that there are at least two 
distinct national legislative components to every ABS situation: source-country 
measures, including provisions clarifying each country’s sovereign rights over genetic 
resources, and the identification of access procedures and requirements; and user-
country measures, by which each country addresses the responsibility of users under 
their jurisdiction who are utilizing genetic resources from other countries.34 Following 
the generally accepted understanding that all countries are both users and providers of 
genetic resources, which is particularly true in the field of crop genetic resources 
development, all countries are required to adopt national legislation to implement the 
CBD benefit-sharing requirement in inter-State relations. This is especially vital for 
those developed and developing countries engaged in intense research and 
sophisticated uses of genetic resources.  
 
The Bonn Guidelines35 were adopted in order to assist governments in establishing 
legislative, administrative or policy measures on ABS. However, they provide limited 
guidance with regard to implementation of the benefit-sharing requirements as set in 
CBD Article 15(7). The Guidelines provide that ‘Contracting Parties with users of 
genetic resources under their jurisdiction should take appropriate legal, administrative 
or policy measures, as appropriate, to support compliance with prior informed consent 
of the Contracting Party providing such resources and mutually agreed terms on 
which access was granted.’36 The Guidelines further provide a list of measures that 
countries with users in their jurisdiction could consider, including mechanisms to 
provide information to potential users on their obligations; measures to encourage 
disclosure of the country of origin of genetic resources and traditional knowledge in 
applications for intellectual property rights; measures to prevent the use of genetic 
resources obtained without the prior informed consent of the provider Party; 
cooperation between Parties to address alleged infringements of ABS agreements; 
voluntary certification schemes; measures discouraging unfair trade practices; and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid., Article 15(6) reads: ‘Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to develop and carry out scientific 
research based on genetic resources provided by other Contracting Parties with the full participation of, 
and where possible in, such Contracting Parties.’  
33 See M.W. Tvedt and T. Young, n. 13 above, at 8. 
34 Ibid., at 3. 
35 Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits 
Arising out of their Utilization (Bonn Guidelines), adopted in Access and benefit-sharing as related to 
genetic resources (CBD Decision VI/24, 27 May 2002).  
36 Ibid., sub-para. 16(d). 
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other measures to encourage users to comply with the Guidelines’ provision on users’ 
obligations for implementation of MAT.37 This provision states, inter alia, that users 
should ‘as much as possible endeavour to carry out their use of the genetic resources 
in, and with the participation of, the providing country’ and should also ensure the fair 
and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the commercialization or other use of 
genetic resources, including technology transfer to providing countries, in conformity 
with MAT. The Guidelines further provide some guidance with regard to the types, 
timing and distribution of benefits, and mechanisms for benefit-sharing, in order to 
assist Parties and stakeholders in the development of MAT to ensure fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits, as well as a list of examples of monetary and non-
monetary benefits.38 Reflecting the voluntary nature of the guidelines, no specific 
requirements are provided. On the contrary, it is acknowledged that the benefit-
sharing mechanism may vary depending upon the type of benefits, the specific 
conditions in the country and the stakeholders involved, and that it should be flexible, 
being determined by the partners involved in benefit-sharing and varying on a case-
by-case basis.39  
 
Against this background, it is notable that the Bonn Guidelines place greater emphasis 
on the benefit-sharing obligations of private-party users as part of their contractual 
obligations,40 rather than on the inter-State dimension of the CBD benefit-sharing 
requirement. This is combined with the Guidelines’ focus on the need for providing 
countries’ legislation on access, which seems to underestimate the fact that access 
legislation in providing countries is not sufficient to achieve fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing. Achieving benefit-sharing would further require enactment of 
supportive legislation in countries with users in their jurisdiction, in order to secure 
their compliance.41 Negotiations on an ABS protocol currently undertaken in the CBD 
framework are expected to clarify the benefit-sharing requirement, ensure compliance 
and drive the development of mutually supportive national legislation.42  
 
Benefit-sharing reaching the community level 
 
While Articles 1 and 15 do not explicitly mention traditional knowledge, this is 
addressed in the context of in situ conservation in Article 8(j) with regard to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid.,  sub-para. 6(b). See C. V. Barber, S. Johnston and B. Tobin, ‘User measures: options for 
developing measures in user countries to implement the access and benefit-sharing provisions of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity’ (UNU-IAS, 2003). 
38 See Bonn Guidelines, n. 36 above, Section D, paras 45-50, and Appendix II. 
39 Ibid., para. 49. 
40 It should be reiterated that a specific ABS agreement would be negotiated and agreed upon for each 
individual case. Parties to the ABS agreement could be the States (government entities) providing and 
requiring access, but also the State providing access and a private entity (i.e. a company or university) 
requiring access and having to share the benefits. Depending on the individual agreement reached on 
the basis of national legislation of the country providing access, benefits would be shared with the 
providing country and/or the community concerned.  
41 See M.W. Tvedt and T. Young, n. 13 above, at 18. 
42 At the time of writing, a resumed session of the ninth meeting of the ABS Working Group is 
scheduled to be held in July 2010, in Montreal, Canada, with the aim of finalizing negotiations for 
possible adoption of an ABS protocol at COP 10, to be held in October 2010, in Nagoya, Japan. For the 
state of play in the ABS negotiations, see J. Gnann, et al., 9:503 Earth Negotiations Bulletin (31 March 
2010). For the protocol text under consideration and Parties’ views, see the Report of the First Part of 
the Ninth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing 
(UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/9/3, 26 April 2010).  
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conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, thereby including traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources, as well as the equitable sharing of 
benefits arising out of the utilization of such knowledge. On this basis, 
notwithstanding the fact that Articles 1 and 15 refer to inter-State relations, while 
Article 8(j) refers to Parties’ domestic policies with respect to traditional knowledge 
of indigenous and local communities living in their territory (as discussed in detail in 
part III), Article 8(j) has been mostly discussed in the context of ABS in the CBD 
framework,43 and traditional knowledge is being addressed in the current negotiations 
for an international ABS regime44 on the basis of a combined reading of Articles 15 
and 8(j). This interpretation beyond the letter of the Convention may be explained by 
the fact that on many occasions, genetic resources attract the interest of 
bioprospectors and gain value because of the traditional knowledge associated with 
them. In other words, it is traditional knowledge that sparks the utilization process or 
provides the lead to the potentially useful properties of a genetic resource.45 It has 
thus been argued that in these cases, genetic resources and traditional knowledge are 
inseparable.46 Furthermore, several high-profile controversial patent cases have 
involved the misappropriation and patenting of traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources.47  
 
While genetic resources belong to States in accordance with the principle of national 
sovereignty, traditional knowledge is held by a particular culture or people: it is 
created in a cultural context and is local in nature.48 In that regard, measures at the 
local level, including benefit-sharing, are needed for traditional knowledge to be 
nurtured and the associated genetic resources to be protected. While enactment of 
national legislation is a necessary precondition for the implementation of, and 
compliance with, the benefit-sharing requirement, specifically targeted policy and 
legal measures are therefore further needed for the benefits to reach the community 
level in the provider country, in order to both reward the custodians of biodiversity 
and holders of traditional knowledge, and assist in poverty alleviation and sustainable 
development in the provider country. 
 	  As opposed to the silence of the CBD third objective and Article 15 on traditional 
knowledge, the Bonn Guidelines note that benefits should be shared fairly and 
equitably with all those who have been identified as having contributed to the 
resource management, scientific and/or commercial process, including indigenous and 
local communities, and that benefits should be directed in such a way as to promote 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Since the launch of the negotiations for an international ABS regime, the CBD Working Group on 
Article 8(j) has been addressing ABS as a permanent issue in its agenda. See for instance the Report of 
the fifth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Article 8(j) and related provisions of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (UNEP/CBD/COP/9/7, 13 November 2007), and Report of the 
sixth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Inter-sessional Working Group on Article 8(j) and related 
provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity (UNEP/CBD/COP/10/2, 21 November 2009), 
Annex II: International regime on access and benefit-sharing: provision of views to the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing. 
44 See the latest, non-negotiated, draft protocol on ABS, available as Annex I to the Report of the first 
part of the ninth meeting of the ABS Working Group, n. 43 above, Articles 4, 5bis, and 9. 
45 See the Report of the sixth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Inter-sessional Working Group on 
Article 8(j), n. 44 above, at 36. 
46 Ibid. 
47 See Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and 
Development (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 2002), at 76. 
48 Ibid, at 37. 
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conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.’49 This express reference to 
indigenous and local communities as potential beneficiaries in the ABS process can 
be arguably read in conjunction with references, in the objectives of the Guidelines, to 
the promotion of technology transfer, contribution to the development by Parties of 
ABS mechanisms that recognize the protection of traditional knowledge, and 
contribution to poverty alleviation and realization of food security, health and cultural 
integrity.50 
 
As noted above, the Bonn Guidelines, however, were not considered to be particularly 
helpful in guiding the drafting of national legislation and enlightening the 
complexities of implementing ABS at the national level. Few countries have drafted 
national ABS legislation51 and many challenges remain. An example of a CBD Party 
that adopted ABS legislation, and may be the only one that acknowledged the 
necessity to ensure that users within its jurisdiction comply with the requirements as 
set by another (provider) country,52 is Norway, which made an attempt to cover the 
entire spectrum of access and benefit-sharing requirements in its recently adopted 
legislation.53 
 
Norway’s 2009 Nature Diversity Act54 sets a number of provisions requiring that 
users within its jurisdiction comply with prior informed consent as required by the 
provider country.55 These provisions are mirrored in the country’s Patents Act, which 
further provides for penalties in case of violation.56 It should be noted however, that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See Bonn Guidelines, n. 36 above, para. 48. 
50 Ibid., para. 11. 
51 An overview of existing instruments, guidelines, codes of conduct and tools addressing ABS is 
available at CBD, ABS Measures (CBD, undated), found at <http://www.cbd.int/abs/measures/>. 
52 See M.W. Tvedt and T. Young, n. 13 above, at 31-32. 
53 A developed country with advanced research and technology sector, Norway has experienced a case 
frequently cited to exemplify the reasons behind the ABS regimes: back in 1969, a soil fungus found in 
a sample taken from Hardangervidda National Park by a Swiss tourist who worked for a company now 
called Novartis, proved to have active compounds that resulted in the development of the best-selling 
anti-rejection drug Cyclosporin A. 
54 Act relating to the management of biological, geological and landscape diversity (Nature Diversity 
Act) - Act 19 No. 100 (June 2009). 
55 Section 60 of the Nature Diversity Act, ibid., reads: ‘The import for utilization in Norway of genetic 
material from a state that requires consent for collection or export of such material may only take place 
in accordance with such consent. The person that has control of the material is bound by the conditions 
that have been set for consent. The state may enforce the conditions by bringing legal action on behalf 
of the person that set them.’ To that end, the legislation sets the requirement for the genetic material 
getting in Norway from another country for research or commercial purposes to be accompanied by 
information regarding the provider country and fulfillment of its national law requirements regarding 
consent for the material’s collection. If the provider country is different than the country of origin, the 
latter should also be stated. 
56 The Norwegian Patents Act - Act No. 9 of 15 December 1967, as last amended by Act No. 80 of 29 
June 2007, Section 8(b), provides for a requirement for disclosure of origin of the biological material 
used in an invention to be included in the patent application, and of the prior informed consent for 
access to the material, in case this was required by the national legislation of the provider country. 
Notably, the duty to disclose such information applies even where the inventor has altered the structure 
of the received material. Breach of the disclosure requirement is subject to criminal sanctions, in 
accordance with Norway’s General Civil Penal Code (1902) Section 166, but does have any patent-
related results, with regard to the processing of the application or the validity of rights arising from 
granted patents, reflecting the provisions of the EU biotech patents directive. See Directive 98/44/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions, [1998] OJ L 213/13. 
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disclosure requirements during the patent application process do not create any right 
for the provider country or the country of origin. Notably, the Norwegian legislation 
makes no specific reference to compliance with benefit-sharing requirements as set by 
the provider country. The disclosure requirement does not confer any benefit-sharing 
obligations on the user, nor does it extend to compliance with benefit-sharing 
obligations set by provider country legislation or MAT. However, as part of its 
objectives, the legislation specifically acknowledges the importance of ‘appropriate 
measures for sharing the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic material in 
such a way as to safeguard the interests of indigenous peoples and local 
communities.’57 The Nature Diversity Act makes several references to the potential 
adoption of regulations for implementation, so it could be the case that a more 
detailed mechanism for benefit-sharing will be established later on. 
 
For the time being, it thus seems that CBD Parties are unwilling (and/or legally 
unable) to implement benefit-sharing as an inter-State obligation. Even if we assume 
that the political will exists to achieve such a goal, several challenges and questions 
remain with regard to the optimal legislative and regulatory approach for user 
countries to ensure that benefits are fairly and equitably shared with the provider 
country. In addition, specific tools are required for the benefits to reach the 
indigenous peoples and local communities and for benefit-sharing as a general 
concept to contribute to the realization of equity and sustainable development 
considerations. The need for user country legislation to implement the CBD’s inter-
State benefit-sharing requirement would need to be combined with systems of 
distribution of benefits within the provider country, to fit each country’s specific 
circumstances and regulatory traditions, in order for the CBD ABS provisions to 
influence and promote realization of benefit-sharing at the community level. Under 
South Africa’s legislation, for example, an access permit is granted only if the 
applicant and a stakeholder have entered into a benefit-sharing agreement approved 
and overseen by the Environment Ministry. The specific benefits to be shared are 
agreed upon by the parties to the agreement. The legislation further establishes a 
bioprospecting trust fund into which all payments are made and from which benefits 
are distributed.58 In the Philippines, to mention another example, national legislation 
requires the person applying for access to agree to pay royalties or other forms of 
compensation to the government or to the community concerned. A list of other 
potential benefit-sharing arrangements are also provided for, including that foreign 
applicants must agree to conduct research in collaboration with Philippine 
institutions.59  
 
A tool attempting to bridge inter-State benefit-sharing with communities’ needs, 
aspirations and livelihoods that has been recently proposed is the bio-cultural protocol 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 See Nature Diversity Act, n. 57 above, Section 57. 
58 South Africa’s Biodiversity Act (No. 10, 2004), especially Articles 80-86. See N. R. Crouch et al., 
‘South Africa’s bioprospecting, access and benefit-sharing legislation: current realities, future 
complications, and a proposed alternative’, 104:9 South African Journal of Science (2008), 355.  
59 Philippines’ Executive Order no. 247, 18 May 1995, prescribing guidelines and establishing a 
regulatory framework for the prospecting of biological and genetic resources, their by-products and 
derivatives, for scientific and commercial purposes; and for other purposes, as amended by the Wildlife 
Act (Act providing for the conservation and protection of wildlife resources and their habitats, 
appropriating funds therefore and for other purposes, Republic Act no. 9147 of 30 July 2001) and its 
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Joint Administrative Order no. 01, 2004), and the Guidelines for 
Bioprospecting Activities in the Philippines (Joint Administrative Order no. 1, January 2005).  
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– a tool promoted by Natural Justice, a legal NGO working with communities in 
southern Africa. Supporting a bottom-up approach, a bio-cultural protocol is a written 
document developed by a community, following a consultative process, to outline the 
core ecological, cultural and spiritual values and customary laws relating to the 
community’s traditional knowledge and resources, based on which the community 
provides clear terms and conditions to regulate access to their knowledge and 
resources. Examples include protocols developed by the Bushbuckridge traditional 
healers in South Africa, the Raika pastoralists in India and the Samburu pastoralists in	  
Kenya.60 
 
Bio-cultural protocols can have two advantages for communities. From an outward 
perspective, they provide a specific framework for defining in a participatory manner 
the types of benefits communities may wish to secure, to support their livelihoods. As 
such, the process leading to the bio-cultural protocol development allows a 
community to prepare in advance for negotiations of an ABS arrangement, rather than 
enter into such negotiations in an ad hoc manner, contributing thus to a more level-
playing field among the parties. From an inward perspective, the development of bio-
cultural protocols allows a community to identify any question related to the 
governance of future benefit-sharing, thus preventing internal conflicts. Compliance 
with the provisions of bio-cultural protocols, however, remains voluntary, unless it is 
secured through national legislation. In addition, bio-cultural protocols would 
generally require capacity-building and legal assistance, so that community members 
can better understand the relevant international and national legal regimes, the 
interests involved and the consequences of their choices. 
 
Multiple regulatory developments are therefore still required for the CBD inter-State 
benefit-sharing requirement to be implemented, let alone reach the community level 
in provider countries. Despite certain positive examples to the contrary, including 
Norway, the majority of countries, in particular countries with users in their 
jurisdiction, still need to put their national legislation in place in order to ensure 
compliance with benefit-sharing arrangements in provider countries. In addition, the 
establishment of specific mechanisms in provider countries is required for benefits to 
reach the community level. However, emphasis placed under the CBD, in particular in 
the context of the Bonn Guidelines, on the obligations of private parties to the ABS 
agreement, has obscured the obligation for enactment of national ABS legislation by 
State Parties, even if the bilateral nature of inter-State benefit-sharing under the CBD 
makes the development of national legislation a conditio sine qua non for global 
implementation of the CBD commitments. This creates further uncertainties as to 
whether and how the benefits may reach communities. Some of these challenges have 
been addressed in the specific field of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture 
through the multilateral solutions proposed by the ITPGR.  
 
The Multilateral System of access and benefit-sharing under the ITPGR 
 
One option for achieving inter-State benefit-sharing is the creation of an international 
system or fund, which would collect benefits from users, in the form of a standard 
payment, and then allocate them to particular activities designed to promote not only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Community Protocols for ABS (UNEP, 
undated), available at <http://www.unep.org/communityprotocols/index.asp>. 
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the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, but also the livelihoods of rural 
communities and indigenous peoples.61 Such a multilateral approach has been adopted 
and is currently operational in the framework of the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR). The rationale for establishing 
such a system is to some degree described in the preamble to the Treaty. First, 
agriculture in all countries depends largely on plant genetic resources that have 
originated elsewhere. Continued and unrestricted access to plant genetic resources, 
therefore, is indispensable for the crop improvements that are necessary for 
sustainable agriculture and food security, in the face of genetic erosion, environmental 
changes, and future human needs. Furthermore, given the millennia of agricultural 
history, the geographical origins of plant genetic resources are often impossible to 
locate, and thus, identification of the country of origin is very difficult. Finally, 
genebanks all over the world now have collections of all major crops, making the 
search for genetic resources in situ unnecessary. All these considerations advocate a 
multilateral, rather than bilateral, approach to access to agricultural biodiversity.62 
  
The Treaty’s Multilateral System of facilitated access and fair and equitable benefit-
sharing,63 which refers to a specified list of plant genetic resources,64 aims to facilitate 
access to, and exchange of, those plant genetic resources that are considered to be 
vital for agricultural research and food security and to institutionalize the sharing of 
benefits arising from their use. Its provision on benefit-sharing65 recognizes that 
facilitated access is itself a major benefit of the Multilateral System and that benefits 
accruing from it will be shared fairly and equitably through a number of inter-State 
mechanisms, under the guidance of the Treaty’s Governing Body, including the 
exchange of information, access to and transfer of technology, capacity building, and 
the sharing of the benefits arising from commercialization. Additionally, Parties are to 
consider the modalities of a strategy of voluntary contributions from food-processing 
industries.  
 
The ITPGR Governing Body has adopted a ‘standard material transfer agreement’ 66 
(SMTA) as the standardized contract that will be used in all transactions involving 
material included in the Multilateral System between providers and users.67 Users can 
include public or private entities. The SMTA includes provisions on a fixed 
percentage of 1.1% that a user shall pay when a product is commercialized, yet not 
available without restriction to others for further research and breeding; and a 
discounted percentage of 0.5% as part of an alternative payments scheme, which 
entails making payments at a discounted rate on all products belonging to one of the 
crops under Annex I of the Treaty, irrespective of whether they are available without 
restriction and whether the product has been developed from material originating 
from the Multilateral System or from other sources. Payments are made to a trust fund 
established by the FAO, and benefits should flow to farmers through projects selected 
and awarded by the Governing Body. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See M.W. Tvedt and T. Young, n. 13 above, at 124.  
62 See H.D. Cooper ‘The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture’ 
11:1 RECIEL (2002), 4. 
63 See ITPGR, n. 4 above, Articles 10-13. 
64 Ibid., Annex I. 
65 Ibid., Article 13. 
66 Ibid., Article 12(4). 
67 ITPGR Governing Body Resolution 2/2006 (16 June 2006).  
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Mandatory payments are not expected to take place soon, taking into consideration 
the time required for research, development, and commercialization. For this reason, 
the benefit-sharing provisions on information exchange, technology transfer, and 
capacity building, accompanied by an appropriate use of the Treaty’s funding 
strategy,68 may have a more vital role to play in the future. In that regard, however, 
several countries have made voluntary contributions to the funding strategy’s benefit-
sharing fund, enabling it to be operational as of 2009. Norway, for example, decided 
to provide an annual contribution equivalent to 0.1% of the total sales of seeds in the 
country to the benefit-sharing mechanism.69 This could be considered an example of 
inter-State benefit-sharing directly supporting farmers in developing countries 
through the ITPGR legal structure. The first round of 11 projects in developing 
countries – some of them at the community level – was financed in 2009, providing 
some indications of how inter-State benefit-sharing could contribute to communities’ 
livelihoods. For instance, one of the funded projects seeks to increase the capacity of 
six communities living in Peru’s potato park in the management, conservation and 
sustainable use of agrobiodiversity, enhance food sovereignty, and promote the 
development of a creative economy based on the sustainable use of the native crops 
and traditional knowledge.70 It should be further noted that the Treaty contains a 
provision recognizing farmers’ contribution to the conservation and development of 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture as well as farmers’ rights, including 
their traditional knowledge and their right to participate in benefit-sharing and in 
national decision-making processes.71 
 
The Treaty’s contribution to farmers’ rights has been acknowledged from a human 
rights perspective in the 2009 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food.72 The Special Rapporteur expressed concerns regarding the consequences of 
intellectual property rights and protected varieties on farmers’ livelihoods and 
traditional knowledge, and encouraged a shift from bilateral benefit-sharing as 
envisaged in the CBD towards direct and multilateral support for agrobiodiversity 
enhancement as provided for by the ITPGR.  
 
While it could be argued that multilateral arrangements such as those provided for by 
the ITPGR could directly reach the local level through an internationally agreed 
mechanism, a variety of challenges remain, particularly with regard to which 
communities or groups will be able to have access to an international mechanism 
detached from their realities, and under which conditions. Both under the CBD and 
under the ITPGR, enactment of national legislation remains the only option for inter-
State benefit-sharing under international law to reach the community level.   
 
III. STATE-TO-COMMUNITY BENEFIT-SHARING  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See ITPGR, n. 4 above, Article 18. 
69 See ITPGR Secretariat press release, ‘Norway announces annual contribution to the benefit-sharing 
fund of the International Treaty (3 March 2008), available at 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agp/planttreaty/news/noti005_en.pdf>.  
70 See ITPGR Secretariat press release, ‘Board of plant treaty announces new benefits for farmers in 11 
developing nations, as efforts heat up to protect valuable food crops in face of threatened shortages, 
climate change’ (undated), available at <ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agp/planttreaty/news/news0009_en.pdf>.  
71 See ITPGR, n. 4 above, Article 9. See also E. Tsioumani, n. 15 above, at 120. 
72 Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food: Seed policies and the right to food: 
enhancing agrobiodiversity and encouraging innovation (UN Doc A/64/170, 23 July 2009).  
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As opposed to the more widely shared understanding of benefit-sharing as an inter-
State obligation under the third objective of the CBD, the concept that emerges from 
CBD Article 8(j) portrays benefit-sharing as recognition of the contribution of 
indigenous and local communities’ traditional knowledge, innovation and practices to 
the conservation of biodiversity73 and - based on a combined reading with Article 
10(c)74 - to the sustainable use of biodiversity components, in consideration of the fact 
that traditional knowledge derives from the customary use of biodiversity components 
and contributes to ensuring the conservation of biodiversity.75 This concept of benefit-
sharing seems to differ significantly from that used in the ABS context as discussed 
above, in that benefits are encouraged to flow from the State to a community within 
its territory for a different use of biodiversity – its conservation and sustainable use, 
according to the first and second objectives of the Convention - rather than in relation 
to the access and use of genetic resources more specifically, under the third objective. 
In the case benefit-sharing from conservation and sustainable use, therefore, the 
benefits are expected to flow directly to communities and immediately contribute to 
their livelihoods as a matter internal to one State.  
 
As opposed to the clearly mandatory language used in Article 15, the text of the 
Convention with regard to State-to-community benefit-sharing is quite open-ended 
and controversial. The CBD preamble only stresses the ‘desirability’ of sharing 
equitably benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge, innovations and 
practices relevant to the conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use of its 
components.76 The language of Article 8(j) itself refers to ‘encourage[ing] the 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, 
innovations and practices’, and its chapeau is qualified by the phrase ‘as far as 
possible and appropriate,’77 leading to discussions among CBD Parties as to the legal 
significance of the provision.78 In addition, the reference to traditional knowledge, 
innovations and practices ‘embodying traditional lifestyles’ may be interpreted as 
excluding from benefit-sharing groups that descended from indigenous and local 
communities but have ‘assimilated into mainstream, non-traditional economy and 
society’.79 It can also be generally remarked that the CBD text does not address more 
in detail the role of indigenous and local communities in in situ conservation.80  
 
Notwithstanding all these difficulties, a clear trend seems to emerge from the 
multitude of decisions adopted by the CBD COP referring to the concept of State-to-
community benefit-sharing in the context of various programmes of work (the main 
instrument that CBD Parties have developed for themselves to achieve the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 D. Schroeder, ‘Justice and Benefit Sharing’, in R. Wynberg et al. (eds.), n. 21 above, 11, at 11 in 
which benefit-sharing is considered a reward for the custodians of biodiversity. 
74 CBD Article 10(c) reads as follows: ‘Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as 
appropriate: [...] Protect and encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with 
traditional cultural practices that are compatible with conservation or sustainable use requirements.’ 
75 See L. Glowka, n. 6 above, at 60. 
76 See P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell, n. 8 above, at 627. 
77 As is the chapeau of Art. 10(c); see n. 74 above.  
78 See Earth Negotiations Bulletin, n. 7 above, at 7. 
79 G. Maggio, ‘Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments 
for Conserving Biodiversity’ 16 UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy (1997-1998) 179-
226, at 210, citing L. Glowka, n. 6 above.  
80 See P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell, n. 7 above, at 628. 
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commitments contained in the Convention) and voluntary guidelines related to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity with specific regard to protected 
areas, forests, mountains, tourism, environmental and socio-cultural impact 
assessment, and the ecosystem approach. Interestingly, not all these references 
provide an explicit link to CBD Article 8(j), and in many respects the concept of 
State-to-community benefit-sharing may not necessarily be directly dependent on the 
use of traditional knowledge as such, thus seemingly having been developed in a way 
that goes beyond the letter of Article 8(j). As will be discussed below, the concept 
may rather operate as a broader incentive to ensure the full and effective participation 
of indigenous and local communities in decision-making and adaptive management of 
biodiversity, or as compensation81 for the costs and negative impacts of biodiversity 
conservation or sustainable management activities on indigenous and local 
communities. As such, the concept of State-to-community benefit-sharing becomes an 
essential tool that underpins and reinforces current efforts to ensure community 
involvement in decision-making and sustainable management of living resources. The 
three functions of State-to-community benefit-sharing will be addressed in turn in the 
following sub-sections. 
 
Benefit sharing and the use of traditional knowledge 
 
The link between benefit-sharing and the use of traditional knowledge as a 
contribution to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity was highlighted in 
Agenda 21, where governments are called upon to ‘recognize and foster the 
traditional methods and the knowledge of indigenous people and their communities, 
emphasizing the particular role of women, relevant to the conservation of biological 
diversity and the sustainable use of biological resources, and ensure the opportunity 
for the participation of those groups in the economic and commercial benefits derived 
from the use of such traditional methods and knowledge.’82 The Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation (JPOI) provides more action-oriented language, calling for the 
development and implementation of benefit-sharing mechanisms on mutually agreed 
terms for the use of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices, subject to 
national legislation and with communities’ approval and involvement.83 Notably, the 
latter reference highlights a sense of urgency in proceeding with national 
implementation on State-to-community benefit-sharing and the need to avoid a top-
down approach in doing so. In addition, the JPOI moves away from a purely 
economic view of the benefits linked to traditional knowledge. 
 
The CBD programme of work on Article 8(j) and related provisions may also lead to 
understanding benefit-sharing as dependent on the use of traditional knowledge, 
innovations and practices.84 According to Task 7 of its programme of work, the CBD 
Working Group Article 8(j) is to develop guidelines for the development of 
mechanisms, legislation or other appropriate initiatives to ensure that indigenous and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Benefit-sharing may also be linked to food security. See B. De Jonge and M. Korthals, ‘Vicissitudes 
of Benefit Sharing of Crop Genetic Resources: Downstream and Upstream’ 6:3 Developing World 
Bioethics (2006), 144, cited in D. Schroeder, ‘Justice and Benefit Sharing’, in R. Wynberg et al. (eds), 
n. 21 above, 11-26, at 21. 
82 Agenda 21 (in Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN. 
Doc. A/CONF.151/26, 13 June 1992, Annex II), para. 15(4)(g) (emphasis added). 
83 See Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, n. 7 above, paras. 44(j). 
84 See CBD, n. 1 above, preambular para. 12; and see L. Glowka, n. 6 above, at 11 and 48. 
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local communities obtain a fair and equitable share of benefits arising from the use 
and application of their knowledge, innovations and practices, and that private and 
public institutions interested in using such knowledge, practices and innovations 
obtain the prior informed approval of these communities.85 Expanding upon the text 
of Article 8(j), therefore, the programme of work specifies the need for a bottom-up 
approach to State-to-community benefit-sharing, and for communities to be active 
participants in the development of such benefit-sharing mechanisms. The Working 
Group accordingly recently produced a draft code of ethical conduct on respect for 
the cultural and intellectual heritage of indigenous and local communities relevant for 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.86 The draft code, 
however, does not provide much clarification on benefit-sharing, as it simply calls in 
general terms for the distribution of benefits for communities’ contribution to 
activities/interactions related to biodiversity and associated traditional knowledge 
proposed to take place, or likely to impact on, their sites.87 
 
Other areas of work under the CBD have contributed to clarifying in more detail the 
link between benefit-sharing and the use of traditional knowledge. Building upon the 
Rio Forest Principles,88 the CBD work programme on forest biodiversity explicitly 
refers to the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits from forest-related traditional 
knowledge,89 emphasizing its link with sustainable use in the context of forest 
management by indigenous and local communities.90 Furthermore, the work 
programme foresees that at the national level the development of community-based 
approaches for the conservation and sustainable use of forest biodiversity built upon 
integrating traditional forest-related knowledge and benefit-sharing considerations, in 
accordance with Article 8(j) and related CBD provisions.91 It further links benefit-
sharing with the goal of addressing socio-economic failures and distortions that lead 
to decisions that result in loss of forest biological diversity, by calling for the 
development of mechanisms to ensure that monetary and non-monetary costs and 
benefits of forest biodiversity management are equitably shared between stakeholders 
at all levels. To this end, the work programme makes reference to the use of forest 
planning and management, stakeholder analysis and mechanisms for transferring 
costs and benefits, providing market and other incentives for the use of sustainable 
practices, develop alternative sustainable income-generation programmes and 
facilitate self-sufficiency programmes of indigenous and local communities.92 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Programme of Work on the Implementation of Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, adopted in Article 8(j) and related provisions (CBD Decision V/16, 22 June 
2000), Annex. 
86 Draft code of ethical conduct on respect for the cultural and intellectual heritage of indigenous and 
local communities relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, contained 
in Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Inter-Sessional Working Group on Article 
8(j) and Related Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/10/2 (21 November 2009), section 6/3, . The draft code is expected to be finalized 
and adopted by CBD COP 10, that will take place in October 2010. 
87 Ibid., para. 12. 
88 Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the 
Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests (UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/126, 13 June 1992); see also comments by D. Shelton, n. 2 above, at 82. 
89 Forest biological diversity (CBD Decision VI/22, 27 May 2002), para. 13.. 
90 Ibid., para. 19(h). 
91 Ibid., para. 34. 
92 Expanded Programme of Work on Forest Biological Diversity, CBD COP Decision VI/22, n. 82 
above, Annex, activities (b) and (f) under Objective 1. 
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The CBD Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines on the Sustainable Use of 
Biodiversity93 also link the inclusion of traditional knowledge in biodiversity 
management planning with benefit-sharing. Principle 4(a) states that adaptive 
management should be practiced based on science and local and traditional 
knowledge, according to a rationale underlining that ‘in many societies traditional and 
local knowledge has led to much use of biological diversity being sustainable over 
long time-periods without detriment to the environment or the resource’, thus 
considering the incorporation of such knowledge into modern use systems critical to 
avoid inappropriate use and enhance sustainable use of biodiversity components. 
Accordingly, adaptive management plans are to incorporate ‘systems to generate 
sustainable revenue, where the benefits go to indigenous and local communities and 
local stakeholders to support successful implementation.’94 
 
Other COP decisions also indicated that benefit-sharing may be a means to contribute 
to the further preservation of traditional knowledge, in addition to rewarding 
communities for the use of their knowledge. The CBD Working Group on Protected 
Areas points in this direction, by encouraging ‘the establishment of protected areas 
that benefit indigenous and local communities, including by respecting, preserving, 
and maintaining their traditional knowledge in accordance with article 8(j) and related 
provisions.’95 Along the same lines, the CBD Guidelines on Biodiversity and Tourism 
Development include among the benefits deriving from biodiversity-based tourism 
activities ‘funds for development or maintenance of sustainable practices,’96 arguably 
including sustainable traditional practices. 
 
The above-mentioned references to benefit-sharing evidence an approach that favours 
the incorporation of traditional knowledge in living resources management through 
planning, and provide for rewarding communities that with their knowledge 
contribute to the adaptive management of biodiversity. 
 
Benefit-sharing and communities’ participation 
 
State-to-community benefit-sharing can also be seen as a tool for reinforcing general 
principles of public participation in environmental decision-making and management, 
and particularly as underpinning efforts to ensure the meaningful participation of 
indigenous and local communities in the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity.97 There is a significant number of explicit references to benefit-sharing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable use of Biodiversity, adopted by CBD 
COP Decision VII/12, Sustainable Use (Article 10) (13 April 2004), Annex II.  
94 Ibid., operational guidelines to Principle 4.   
95 Programme of Work on Protected Areas, adopted by CBD COP Decision VII/28, Protected Areas 
(Articles 8 (a) to (e)) (13 April 2004), Annex, para. 1.1.7. 
96 International guidelines for activities related to sustainable tourism development in vulnerable 
terrestrial, marine and coastal ecosystems and habitats of major importance for biological diversity and 
protected areas, including fragile riparian and mountain ecosystems, Biological Diversity and tourism 
(CBD Decision VII/14, 13 April 2004), Annex, para. 43.  
97 See G. Maggio, n. 83 above, at 181. See also D. Shelton, n. 2 above, at 84-87; and Rio Principle 22, 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ (UN Doc A/CONF.151/6/Rev.1, 13 June 1992), 
which reads: ‘States should recognize and duly support the identity, culture and interests [of indigenous 
and local communities] and enable their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable 
development.’ 
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in the CBD COP decisions that, going beyond the letter of Article 8(j), point to the 
use of this concept as expecting States to fully involve communities in the governance 
of biodiversity conservation and sustainable use, encouraging and rewarding them for 
their participation in decision-making through legal recognition and promotion of 
community management systems, provision of capacity-building services, making 
available employment or other income-generation opportunities, and ultimately 
sharing economic revenues derived from the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity (such as park entrance fees, licences fees for wildlife watching or 
sustainable hunting, etc.) or giving precedence to community-based mechanisms for 
conservation and sustainable use.  
 
The CBD COP decisions on the ecosystem approach, for instance, indicates that 
benefit-sharing is expected to target stakeholders responsible for the production and 
management of the benefits flowing from the multiple functions provided by 
biodiversity at the ecosystem level, including capacity-building, especially at the level 
of local communities managing biological diversity in ecosystems and local 
incentives for good management practices.98 This is based on the understanding that 
where those who control land use do not receive benefits from maintaining natural 
ecosystems and processes, they are likely to initiate unsustainable practices for short-
term benefits.99  In line with the ecosystem approach, the CBD work programme on 
protected areas also clearly links benefit-sharing with communities’ participation in 
biodiversity conservation. Its programme element 2 is tellingly titled ‘Governance, 
participation, equity and benefit-sharing’ and links the goal of promoting equity and 
benefit-sharing with the legal recognition and effective management of indigenous 
and local community conserved areas in a manner consistent with the goals of 
conserving both biodiversity and the knowledge, innovations and practices of these 
communities, using the social and economic benefits generated by protected areas for 
poverty reduction, consistent with protected-area management objectives. To this end, 
it stresses the need for engaging indigenous and local communities and relevant 
stakeholders in participatory planning and governance.100 
 
The CBD Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of 
Biodiversity further provide an interesting exemplification of benefit-sharing as an 
incentive for communities’ participation. The rationale is that local people 
involvement facilitates compliance with legislation on the sustainable use of natural 
resources, and that management regimes are enhanced when constructive programmes 
that benefit local communities are implemented, such as training to identify income 
alternatives, or assistance in diversifying their management capacities.101 On this 
basis, the operational guidelines to Principle 4 recommend adopting policies and 
regulations that ensure that indigenous and local communities and local stakeholders 
who are engaged in the management of a resource for sustainable use receive an 
equitable share of any benefits derived from that use, and promoting economic 
incentives that will guarantee additional benefits to those involved in the management 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Principles of the Ecosystem approach, in Ecosystem approach (CBD Decision V/6, 22 June 2000), 
Annex B, Operational Guidance 2, para. 9. 
99 Refinement and Elaboration of the Ecosystem Approach, Based on Assessment of Experience of 
Parties in Implementation, in Ecosystem approach (CBD Decision VII/11, 13 April 2004), Annex I, 
annotations to rationale to Principle 4. 
100 Ibid., Annex I, paras. 2.1.3-2.1.5. 
101 See Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines, n. 97 above, rationale to Principle 4.  
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of any biodiversity components, such as job opportunities for local peoples, or equal 
distribution of returns amongst locals and outside investors, and support for co-
management. In addition, the guidelines use benefit-sharing as a means specifically to 
ensure local stakeholder participation in projects led by foreign investors. In these 
instances, the link with Article 8(j) is hardly visible. Rather, one can infer that benefit-
sharing is used as an incentive to ensure the effective participation of indigenous and 
local communities in the sustainable use of biodiversity, further contributing to 
sustainable development, as well as a means to prompt compliance with conservation 
and sustainable use regulations. Thus, community participation in decision-making 
and management planning is not considered per se a reward for communities, in 
recognition of the costs and risks that participation may create in practice for 
communities. 
 
Based on the ecosystem approach, there are quite a few examples of national 
legislation providing for specific ways in which communities can participate in the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and benefit from it.102 In the 
Philippines, protected areas buffer zones may provide regulated benefits and 
livelihood opportunities to local communities. Among the criteria for selection of 
buffer zones are the potential capacity of the area to prevent the community from 
encroaching the protected area through the provision of alternative supplies of 
resources such as wildlife farms, the potential of the area to enhance local community 
participation for the purpose of increasing the level of support to, and acceptance of, 
the principles of buffer zone management, and the existence of traditional practices 
within the area.103 In Vietnam, households and individuals lawfully living in 
conservation zones have the right to benefit from profits earned from eco-tourism 
services.104  
 
In some instances, national laws call for the conclusions of contracts between 
authorities and communities in order to implement benefit-sharing. In South Africa, 
the management authority may enter into an agreement with local communities for 
the co-management of a protected area or the regulation of human activities that affect 
the environment in the area, which can provide for delegation of powers, benefit-
sharing, use of biological resources, development of local management capacity and 
knowledge exchange.105 Along similar lines, in Ethiopia, communities may be 
authorized to administer wildlife habitats under agreements with regions, and 
regulations should determine mechanisms to share the profits derived from the 
utilization of wildlife resources between federal government and regions and to 
benefit communities.106  
 
In other instances, in line with the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines, national 
legislation requires natural resources management plans to provide for the public to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 This information is based on E. Morgera, Wildlife Law and the Empowerment of the Poor, FAO 
Legislative Study (forthcoming in 2010). (It should be noted that the study is limited to national 
legislation on the conservation and sustainable use of terrestrial and avian wild animals.). 
103 The Philippines Department of Environment and Natural Resources Memorandum Circular 
prescribing guidelines for the establishment and management of buffer zones for protected areas, No. 
16 (1993).  
104 Vietnam’s Biodiversity Law, No. 20/2008/HQ12, 2008, Articles 28-31. 
105 South Africa’s National Environmental Management Protected Areas Act (No. 57, 2003), Article 
42.  
106 Ethiopia’s Proclamation Wildlife Areas and Authority (No. 541, 2007) Articles 7 and 10. 
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participate in management activities and in benefit-sharing. In the Republic of Congo, 
local communities must be involved in the preparation and implementation of 
protected areas management plans and must benefit from revenues generated by 
activities carried out in protected areas. Minimum contents of plans include specific 
ways to involve the local population in management.107 Cameroon’s national 
legislation provides an articulated system of wildlife management planning 
requirements, in the framework of which plans de gestion must set out measures 
intended to involve local people in all management phases and for the equitable sharing 
of benefits.108  
 
One of the CBD decisions on the ecosystem approach also suggests that benefit-
sharing could be undertaken by a community organization, in terms of good 
governance,109 and decisions about the allocation of benefits between the community 
should be done by the community itself.110 This concern is also sometimes reflected in 
national legislation. In Namibia, ‘conservancy committees’ can be created by any 
group of persons residing on communal land when the relevant minister is satisfied 
that the committee has the ability to manage funds and has an appropriate method for 
the equitable distribution, to members of the community, of benefits derived from the 
consumptive and non-consumptive use of game in such area.111 
 
According to this use of State-to-community benefit-sharing, the concept operates as 
an indispensable ingredient to guarantee sustainable use, ensuring that local 
populations receive benefits and thus providing them with a direct stake in conserving 
biodiversity, a legal market with moderate prices for its sustainable use and an 
economic incentive to prevent poaching.112  More specifically, the above-mentioned 
guidance from the CBD COP shows that benefit-sharing implies that the State is 
expected to couple community participation in decision-making and management 
planning related to biodiversity with legal recognition and support of communities’ 
sustainable practices, the provision of guidance (such as training or capacity-building) 
to improve the environmental sustainability of community practices, and the proactive 
identification of opportunities for better/alternative livelihoods in these endeavours, 
with a view to facilitating understanding of, and compliance with, the law. 
 
Benefit-sharing as compensation for negative impacts on communities 
 
The CBD Parties have also contributed to a formulation of State-to-community 
benefit-sharing as a way to compensate indigenous and local communities for 
negative impacts caused by conservation and sustainable use efforts. The CBD work 
programme on protected areas, for instance, points to the need to ‘[a]ssess the 
economic and socio-cultural costs, benefits and impacts arising from the 
establishment and maintenance of protected areas, particularly for indigenous and 
local communities, and adjust policies to avoid and mitigate negative impacts, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Congo’s Wildlife Law (Loi n. 37-2008 sur la faune et les aires protégées), Articles 20-22.  
108 Cameroon’s Wildlife and National Parks Act (Décret No 95-466/PM fixant les modalités 
d'application du régime de la faune) (1995), Article 22. 
109 Refinement and Elaboration of the Ecosystem Approach, Based on Assessment of Experience of 
Parties in Implementation, n. 103 above, para 18. 
110 Ibid., Principle 2, Implementation Guideline 2.1. 
111 Namibia’s Nature Conservation Amendment Act (No. 5, 1996), Article 3. 
112 N. Matz-Lück, ‘Biological Diversity, International Protection’, in R. Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009).  
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where appropriate compensate costs and equitably share benefits in accordance with 
the national legislation’.113 Along similar lines, one of the decisions on the ecosystem 
approach calls for assessing the costs and benefits of conserving, maintaining, using 
and restoring ecosystems and for taking into account the interests of all relevant 
stakeholders for equitably sharing the benefits according to national law.114 
 
The Akwé: Kon Guidelines for the conduct of cultural, environmental and social 
impact assessment on sacred sites and on lands and waters traditionally occupied or 
used by indigenous and local communities, provide for a more detailed application of 
State-to-community benefit-sharing as compensation, in their attempt to support the 
incorporation of cultural, environmental and social considerations of indigenous and 
local communities into new or existing impact assessment procedures. The Guidelines 
contain references to benefit-sharing that seem to be based on an understanding of 
traditional practices as inherent in the traditional occupation of lands and waters, and 
seem to suggest that impact assessments can be used as tools that contribute to the 
equitable sharing of benefits, by identifying and weighting expected cultural, social 
and environmental costs and impacts of proposed developments, as well as 
communities’ opportunities and traditional contributions to conservation and 
sustainable use. The Guidelines recommend that the cultural, environmental and 
social impact assessment reflects ‘a balance between economic, social, cultural and 
environmental concerns, on the one hand, while, on the other hand, maximizing 
opportunities for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, the 
access and equitable sharing of benefits and the recognition of traditional knowledge, 
innovations and practices in accordance with Article 8(j) of the Convention, and 
should seek to minimize risks to biological diversity.’115 Specifically, they provide 
that ‘[p]roposed developments on sacred sites and on lands and waters traditionally 
occupied or used by indigenous and local communities should ensure that tangible 
benefits accrue to such communities, such as payment for environmental services, job 
creation within safe and hazard-free working environments, viable revenue from the 
levying of appropriate fees, access to markets, and diversification of income-
generating (economic) opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses.’116  
 
Along similar lines, the CBD Guidelines on Biodiversity and Tourism seem to imply 
a concept of benefit-sharing as compensation, by including among their goals the 
‘[f]air and equitable sharing of benefits of tourism activities, with emphasis on the 
specific needs of the indigenous and local communities concerned,’117 and the need 
for ‘[p]roviding alternative and supplementary ways for communities to receive 
revenue from biological diversity.’118 To this end, the Guidelines list a series of 
possible benefits arising from tourism and the conservation of biodiversity to be 
shared with indigenous and local communities, including job creation, fostering local 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 See Programme of Work on Protected Areas, n. 99 above, para. 2(1)(1).  
114 See Refinement and Elaboration of the Ecosystem Approach, Based on Assessment of Experience 
of Parties in Implementation , n. 103 above, para. 12(5).  
115 Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines for the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment regarding Developments Proposed to Take Place on, or which are Likely to Impact on, 
Sacred Sites and on Lands and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used by Indigenous and Local 
Communities, in Article 8(j) and related provisions (CBD COP 7 Decision VII/16F, 13 April 2004), 
para. 56. 
116 Ibid., para. 46. 
117 See Guidelines on Biodiversity and Tourism Development, n. 100 above, para. 22. 
118 Ibid., para. 43. 
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enterprises, participation in tourism enterprises and projects, education, direct 
investment opportunities, economic linkages and ecological services.119  
 
In addition, Principle 12 of the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines clearly links 
benefit-sharing not only with rewards for positive contributions to conservation and 
sustainable use, but also with some sort of compensation for negative impacts of 
conservation activities on communities.120 Its associated guideline recommends 
involving local stakeholders, including indigenous and local communities, in the 
management of any natural resource and providing those involved with equitable 
compensation for their efforts, taking into account monetary and non-monetary 
benefits. 
 
It is worth noting that also in the context of the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES),121 recent discussions on the impacts of the CITES-
listing decisions on the livelihoods of the poor have made reference to benefit-
sharing.122 This was based on the understanding that implementation of CITES ‘fails 
when it is not connected to people’ and that CITES parties should identify ‘positive 
incentives for people to conserve wild fauna and flora.’ In a proposed resolution,123 
principles are set out that CITES Parties should consider in addressing livelihoods 
issues by developing trade associations with clear obligations for benefit-sharing, 
recognizing resource tenure for indigenous and tribal communities and the poor, 
developing market-based incentives to encourage benefit-sharing, with regard to 
compensatory mechanisms for the shift from in situ to ex situ production, and 
developing mitigation strategies for human-wildlife conflicts that provide alternative 
or compensation schemes, such as payment for ecosystem services, employment 
opportunities, and development of alternative products. 124 
 
The relevance of State-to-community benefit-sharing is also reflected in the current 
debate on the indigenous peoples’ right to provide prior informed consent.125 In 2009, 
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous peoples, for instance, included an analysis of the duty of States to consult 
with indigenous peoples on matters affecting them, focusing in particular on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Ibid., para. 23. 
120 Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines, n. 97 above, Principle 12 states that ‘the needs of 
indigenous and local communities who live with and are affected by the use and conservation of 
biological diversity, along with their contributions to its conservation and sustainable use, should be 
reflected in the equitable distribution of the benefits from the use of those resources.’ 
121 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Washington 
D.C., 3 March 1973).  
122 See CITES Resolution Conf. 8.3 (Rev. CoP 13), Recognition of the benefits of trade in wildlife, 
1992 (12 March 1992, as amended on 14 October 2004); and Decisions 14.3 and 14.4, CITES and 
livelihoods (15 June 2007).  
123 COP working document on CITES and livelihoods, prepared by the Chair of the Standing 
Committee Working Group on CITES and Livelihoods in consultation with UN Environment 
Programme World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Annex 2, para. 9 (CoP15 Doc. 14, 5 November 
2009). The proposal was not adopted in 2010 and will be reconsidered in 2013, at CITES COP 16.  
124 At the time of writing, the resolutions and decisions adopted at CITES COP 15, held from 13-25 
March 2010, in Doha, Qatar, are not yet available. See the summary record of the second session of 
Committee II (CITES doc. CoP15 Com. II Rec. 2 (Rev. 1), 15 March 2010), para. 14; and the summary 
record of the third plenary session (CITES doc. CoP15 Plen. 3 (Rev.1), 24 March 2010). 
125 For an earlier reflection on benefit-sharing related to traditional knowledge and human rights, see D. 
Shelton, n. 2 above, at 87-101. 
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consultations in the context of development and natural resources extraction 
initiatives affecting indigenous lands. He stressed that indigenous peoples should be 
provided with ‘full and objective information about all aspects of the project that will 
affect them, including the impact of the project on their lives and environment.’126 To 
this end, an environmental and social impact study should be carried out and its 
outcome should be presented to indigenous groups at an early stage of the 
consultations. In addition, the Special Rapporteur recommended that consensus-
driven consultation processes should not only address measures to mitigate or 
compensate for adverse impacts of projects, but also explore and arrive at means of 
equitable benefit-sharing in a spirit of true partnership.127  
 
State-to-community benefit-sharing as compensation for negative impacts thus 
represents a practical implication of the principle of intra-generational equity, as 
taking into account the possible impacts of policies and decisions on the poor.128 As 
the above-cited guidance from the CBD COP shows, State-to-community benefit-
sharing not only provides for incentives and rewards when community practices and 
knowledge contribute to conservation and sustainable use, but also specific measures  
(payments for ecosystem services, diversification of income-generating opportunities, 
and other mitigation measures) to address instances in which the interests of 
biodiversity protection are in an irreconcilable conflict with the legitimate interests of 
communities, and the former need to prevail. To this end, undertaking cultural, social 
and environmental impact assessments with the full engagement of relevant 
communities is an indispensable procedural step. 
 
Private sector-to-community benefit-sharing? 
 
Notwithstanding the examples of national legislation cited in the preceding sections, it 
seems – as was noted in the case of inter-State benefit-sharing – that CBD Parties are 
generally quite reluctant to put into operation, and in some instances even recognize, 
State-to-community benefit-sharing. This is demonstrated by limited progress in the 
implementation of State-to-community benefit-sharing at the national level.129 As a 
result, the CBD voluntary guidelines cited above – as already noted with regard to the 
Bonn Guidelines – are also addressed to non-State actors, especially the private 
sector. This is the case of the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines,130 the 
Guidelines on Biodiversity and Tourism Development,131 the Akwé: Kon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous people (UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, 15 July 2009), para. 53. 
127 Ibid. 
128 D. Bartow Magraw and L. Hawke, ‘Sustainable Development’ in D. Bodanski, J. Brunnée and E. 
Hey, n. 1 above, 630. 
129 As documented in 2009 in relation to protected areas (In-depth Review of the Implementation of the 
Programme of Work on Protected Areas (UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/SABSTTA/14/5, 14 January 2010), at 
8-9), for instance. 
130 Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines, n. 97 above, para. 1 clarifies that ‘The principles provide a 
framework for advising Governments, resource managers, indigenous and local communities, the 
private sector and other stakeholders about how they can ensure that their use of the components of 
biodiversity will not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity.’ 
131 Guidelines on Biodiversity and Tourism Development, n. 100 above, para. 2 clarifies that the 
Guidelines provide a framework for addressing what the proponent of new tourism investment or 
activities should do to seek approval, as well as technical guidance to managers with responsibility 
concerning tourism and biodiversity. 
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Guidelines132 and the draft ethical code.133 In those instances, references to benefit-
sharing may not only refer to the role of the State in directly sharing benefits with 
communities and developing national legislation to that effect, but also the possibility 
for the private sector134 to share benefits between with relevant indigenous and local 
communities.  
 
An interesting operationalization of this facet of benefit-sharing can be found in the 
BioTrade Initiative of the UN Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
which was launched in 1996.135 The initiative engages private companies to develop a 
verification framework that will formally recognise their efforts towards conservation 
and sustainability, including issues of accountability, social and environmental 
responsibility, and socio-economic sustainability. To this end, benefit-sharing is 
considered particularly significant for companies to achieve the verification of their 
compliance with the BioTrade principles and criteria.136 Indeed, Biotrade Principle 3 
calls for BioTrade activities to equitably share the benefits derived from the use of 
biodiversity, including informed, transparent, and inclusive interaction among all 
actors involved in the production and commercialisation of biodiversity products. In 
addition, Principle 4 on socio-economic sustainability, refers to the importance of 
benefits reaching local communities through the generation of employment and the 
improvement of the standard of living. Principle 7 on the need for clarity about land 
tenure, use and access to natural resources and knowledge, highlights the need to 
recognise the rights of actors providing traditional knowledge used in product 
development, valuing and rewarding them in the appropriate manner.137  
 
Another example has been developed in the framework of collaboration between the 
CBD, the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and an association of private 
enterprises that elaborated the Natural Resources Stewardship Circle Declaration 
(NRSCD), to provide guidance to the aromatic, perfume, and cosmetics industry 
interacting with indigenous peoples.138 According to guidance to industry concerning 
the implementation of commitments contained in the NRSCD, interactions between 
industry and communities should be based on an equal dialogue between partners, in 
order to have equitable sharing of benefits and to achieve mutual goals including 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Although they are directed to Parties and governments (Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines, n. 120 
above, para. 1), the Guidelines are expected to provide a collaborative framework for Governments, 
indigenous and local communities, decision makers and managers of developments (para. 3). 
133 The draft code is expected to be used as a model to establish or improve national frameworks by 
governments, academic institutions, private sector developers and other potential stakeholders (see 
Draft code of ethical conduct n. 90 above, section 6/3).  
134 For an early reflection on the role of multinational companies in ensuring the protection of 
traditional knowledge, see Shelton, n. 2 above, at 101-102. 
135 The term ‘biotrade’ refers to the ‘collection, production, transformation, and commercialisation of 
goods and services derived from native biodiversity under the criteria of environmental, social and 
economic sustainability.’ See The BioTrade Initiative (Biotrade, undated) found at 
<http://www.biotrade.org/Intro/bti.htm>.  
136 See BioTrade  Principles and Criteria (Biotrade, undated), found at 
<http://www.biotrade.org/Intro/Principles/bti-principles.htm>.  
137 M.J. Oliva, ‘Practical guidelines for equitable sharing of benefits of biological resources in 
BioTrade activities: Concept note’ (Biotrade, June 2006), found at 
<http://www.biotrade.org/btfp/Legal/Legal_docs/BS_Concept_Note_Draft_en.pdf>. 
138 See the report of the meeting ‘Indigenous and local communities, business and biodiversity 
consultation’, held in New York on 12-13 May 2009 (13 May 2009), available at 
<http://www.equatorinitiative.org/images/stories/events/2009events/tribal_link_csd/ilcs_business_biod
iversity_report_final_iv.pdf>. 
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conservation and sustainable use.139 
 
Finally, the International Finance Corporation, which is the private-sector arm of the 
World Bank family providing loans to private companies for projects in developing 
countries,140 has adopted criteria for the private sector’s environmental performance 
that are clearly based on international environmental law141 and include reference to 
benefit-sharing in relation to cultural heritage, based on the CBD.142 The explanatory 
notes clarify that cultural heritage in this respect includes ‘intangible forms of culture, 
such as cultural knowledge, innovations and practices of communities embodying 
traditional lifestyles, based on the environmental and social assessment according to 
the Akwé: Kon Guidelines. The requirements of this Performance Standard apply to 
cultural heritage regardless of whether or not it has been legally protected or 
previously disturbed.’143 
 
The multiple roles of State-to-community benefit-sharing 
 
It emerges from the above brief excursus that while State-to-community benefit-
sharing may be directly linked to the use of traditional knowledge, this is not 
necessarily its sole purpose. The need to ensure the full involvement of indigenous 
and local communities in the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, 
possibly based on an implicit understanding that traditional knowledge will be used to 
this end, and to compensate communities for negative impacts of conservation and 
sustainable use activities at the local level may also provide a clear justification for 
State-to-community benefit-sharing. Thus, this concept is based on the expectation 
that the State (and other non-State actors, in the absence of, or in addition to, relevant 
State measures) adopt a bottom-up approach to building a true partnership with 
communities for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity by proactively 
providing for a combination of economic and non-economic benefits. 
 
State-to-community benefit-sharing may thus be based on a human right-based 
approach to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. This seems supported by 
the 2007 decision in the case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights,144 which viewed benefit-sharing as inherent to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Ibid., Annex, para. 8. 
140 The IFC represents the largest multilateral source of financing for private sector projects in the 
developing world. More information on the IFC is available on its website at The International Finance 
Corporation (IFC, undated), found at <http://www.ifc.org>; and see IFC, ‘IFC in Brief: Investing in 
Progress with Experience, Innovation, and Partnership’  (IFC, 2006), found at 
<http://www.wfs.sachsen.de/set/1551/ifc_in_brief.pdf>.  
141 See generally E. Morgera, ‘Significant Trends in Corporate Environmental Accountability: The 
New Performance Standards of the International Finance Corporation’, 18:1 Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy (2007), 184. 
142 IFC, ‘Performance Standards on Social & Environmental Sustainability’, Performance Standard 8: 
Cultural Heritage (IFC, 2006), at 32-34, found at, 
<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/Content/PerformanceStandards>. 
143 IFC, ‘Guidance Notes: Performance Standards on Social & Environmental Sustainability’ (IFC, 
2007), at 159-160, found at 
<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/Content/PerformanceStandards>. 
144 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, judgment of 28 
November 2007.  
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right of compensation for limitations to the rights to property,145 depending on the 
effective participation of the members of the Saramaka people, in conformity with 
their customs and traditions, regarding any development, investment, exploration or 
extraction plan within their territory and on the carrying out of a prior environmental 
and social impact assessment.146 It has also been noted that the provisions on prior 
informed consent in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples147 imply 
the need to undertake a preliminary assessment of the likely economic, social, cultural 
and environmental impact, including potential risks and fair and equitable benefit-
sharing in a context that respects the precautionary principle.148 
 
State-to-community benefit-sharing may be otherwise explained as a pragmatic 
approach to ensure good governance and adaptive management for the conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity: ensuring benefit-sharing from the rational use of 
natural resources to resource-dependent communities may serve as an incentive for 
communities that in all events utilise resources over which they exercise control.149  
This also serves to facilitate communities’ compliance with applicable laws. From 
that viewpoint, the importance of the State-to-community dimension of benefit-
sharing resides in its ability to focus on the local level to ensure effective conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity: it calls upon States to pay attention to local socio-
economic needs and interests of long-term occupant communities in their 
conservation efforts.150 Overall, States are thus expected to engage with the practical 
difficulties that communities face in effectively contributing to biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable use. 
 
What also emerges from the preceding sections is that the CBD Parties have gradually 
contributed to spell out concrete procedural steps for implementing State-to-
community benefit-sharing151 through the use of environmental and social impact 
assessments, the integration of traditional knowledge and community concerns in 
management plans, the legal recognition and active support of community-based 
management arrangements, the setting-up of benefit-sharing mechanisms when 
revenue generated through conservation and sustainable use activities is accrued by 
the State or outside investors, the provision of livelihood-based mitigation and 
compensatory measures, the use of other incentives such as payments for ecosystem 
services, as well as the re-investment of benefits in the protection of traditional 
knowledge and traditional sustainable practices.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 This is based on Article 21(2) of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (San José, 22 
November 1969), which reads: ‘No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just 
compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the 
forms established by law.’ 
146 See Saramaka People v. Suriname, n. 139 above,  para. 129. See comments by T. Greiber, et al. 
Conservation with Justice: A Rights-Based Approach, IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 
71 (IUCN, 2009), at 19-20. 
147 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNGA Res 61/295, 13 September 2007). See 
Article 19, which reads: ‘States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed 
consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect 
them.’ 
148 See T. Greiber et al., n. 151 above, at 19-20. 
149 See G. Maggio, n. 83 above, at 180 and 185. 
150 Ibid., at 181. 
151 This is quite significant, given the silence of the Convention on this aspect, as remarked by D. 
Shelton, n. 2 above, at 80.  
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These linkages are well illustrated by the CBD work programme on mountain 
biodiversity, whereby local capacity for sustainable tourism management should be 
strengthened to ensure that benefits derived from tourism activities are shared by 
indigenous and local communities, while preserving natural and cultural heritage 
values 152 In this relation, the work programme also foresees the promotion of 
sustainable land-use practices, techniques and technologies of indigenous and local 
communities and community-based management systems, for the conservation and 
sustainable use (including pastoralism, hunting and fishing) of wild flora and fauna 
and agro-biodiversity in mountain ecosystems, as well as support for activities of 
indigenous and local communities involved in the use of traditional mountain-related 
knowledge, in particular concerning sustainable management of biodiversity, soil, 
water resources and slope.153 In addition the work programme provides for 
encouraging the implementation of environmental and social impact assessments at 
sectoral, programme and project levels, taking into account specificities of indigenous 
and local communities depending upon mountain ecosystems, by observing the 
Akwé: Kon voluntary guidelines.154 What the mountain biodiversity work programme 
also shows is how the multiple functions of State-to-community benefit-sharing may 
be difficult to distinguish in practice, and should be mutually reinforcing. 
 
Better understanding of the emerging multi-faceted role of State-to-community 
benefit-sharing can be an important component of the upcoming in-depth review of 
the programme of work of Article 8(j) and related CBD provisions with the purpose 
of continuing the Working Group on Article 8(j). The review is scheduled for COP 10 
in Nagoya, Japan, in October 2010, and is expected to place greater focus on the 
interlinkages between the protection of traditional knowledge, innovations and 
practices and the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and, the fair 
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of traditional 
knowledge, innovations and practices.155 In addition, this conceptual work may also 
play a significant role in other international processes in which benefit-sharing is 
discussed, as will be highlighted in the following section. 
 
IV. BENEFIT-SHARING OUTSIDE THE CBD PROCESS 
The legal concept of benefit-sharing is relevant in other international processes, 
outside the framework of the CBD and other biodiversity-related conventions. These 
include negotiations on the relationship between the CBD and the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)156 of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO); the protection of genetic resources, traditional knowledge and 
traditional cultural expressions in the framework of the Intergovernmental Committee 
on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore 
(IGC) of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); the framework for 
sharing influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits under the World 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Work Programme on Mountain Biodiversity, in Mountain Biological Diversity (CBD decision 
VII/27, 13 April 2004), Annex, para. 1.3.7. 
153 Ibid., paras. 1.3.2-1.3.4. 
154 Ibid., para 219. 
155 Article 8(j) and related provisions (CBD Decision IX/13A, 9 October 2008), para. 11.  
156 World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(Marrakesh, 15 April 1994). 
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Health Organization (WHO);157 and reducing emissions from deforestation, forest 
degradation, sustainable forest management, forest conservation and enhancement of 
carbon stocks (REDD-plus) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).158 The following overview will contribute to identify instances in which 
the concepts of benefit-sharing elaborated under the biodiversity-related conventions 
may influence negotiations. 
Intellectual property governance: TRIPS and WIPO IGC 
The intellectual property governance structure provides a clear example of how 
several negotiators, particularly from developing countries, have been attempting to 
use principles enshrined in the CBD in other fora to achieve inter-State benefit-
sharing and promote equity and sustainable development objectives. Following 
several high-profile controversial patent cases involving genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge, including turmeric, neem, ayahuasca and hoodia,159 many 
analysts realized that the intellectual property structures and officers lack the norms 
and tools to prevent ‘wrong’ patents based on prior art, let alone to take into account 
the CBD objectives. It was argued that unless the TRIPS Agreement is amended to 
ensure respect for the CBD principles also in the intellectual property field, 
implementation and enforceability of such principles will be lacking.160 While 
patenting based on the use of genetic resources is allowed under TRIPS, subject to 
meeting patentability criteria, the CBD objectives are currently not supported because 
the patentability requirements do not require evidence of prior informed consent or 
MAT for benefit-sharing. Furthermore, there is nothing in TRIPS to provide support 
for the CBD’s principle of national sovereignty so foreign companies may obtain 
private rights derived from national resources without having to adhere to CBD 
principles.161 Although it can be argued that access to resources in violation of the 
CBD principles of prior informed consent and benefit-sharing may not be legitimate, 
in the absence of national legislation	   implementing such principles, enforceability is 
weak, if existent at all. 
Therefore, several developing countries have been calling for an amendment to 
TRIPS to bring it in line with the CBD by introducing requirements to disclose the 
origin of genetic material and evidence of prior informed consent and benefit-sharing 
in patent applications. The original proposal, submitted by a group of developing 
countries led by India and Brazil,162 was eventually supported by a coalition of 110 
WTO members by 2008, when a strategic alliance was made with the EU and 
Switzerland calling for a procedural decision to negotiate in parallel the biodiversity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 It should be noted that discussions on benefit-sharing are also occurring in the area of transboundary 
freshwaters, but this is not addressed in this article. See, for instance, H. Qaddumi, Practical 
approaches to transboundary water benefit sharing, Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 
292 (July 2008), found at: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1929.pdf>. 
158 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York, 26 May 1992) (UNFCCC). 
159 See, for instance, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property 
Rights and Development (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 2002), at 76. 
160 Ibid. See also M. Chouchena-Rojas, M. Ruiz Muller, D. Vivas and S. Winkler, Disclosure 
Requirements: Ensuring mutual supportiveness between the WTO TRIPS Agreement and the CBD 
(IUCN and ICTSD, November 2005). 
161 See Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, n. 159 above, at 84. 
162 Documents circulated under the 2001 mandate of the Doha Development Agenda are available at: 
Article 27.3b, traditional knowledge, biodiversity’ (WTO, undated), found at: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_e.htm>. 
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amendment and geographical indications, another issue under discussion in the TRIPS 
Council.163  
While certain developed countries prefer the issue of disclosure to be addressed in the 
WIPO IGC, as reviewed below, an amendment of the TRIPS Agreement 
incorporating disclosure requirements would strengthen implementation and 
enforcement, as it would be linked to the WTO dispute settlement system. Therefore, 
requiring patent applicants to disclose the source of the genetic resource and 
traditional knowledge used in their inventions – as well as evidence of prior informed 
consent and benefit-sharing – has been raised as a possible mechanism for using the 
intellectual property system to ensure legal access and benefit-sharing. A multilateral 
obligation to implement disclosure requirements, if incorporated in the TRIPS 
Agreement, would trigger the required national legislative action. It would contribute 
towards addressing misappropriation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
and eventually to improved inter-State benefit-sharing in accordance with the CBD 
principles. Such proposals, however, remain controversial, and it remains to be seen 
whether negotiations will achieve any progress. Work and analysis achieved in the 
CBD framework, particularly regarding user country measures and tools, can be vital 
in that regard. 
At the same time, certain developed countries have been calling for disclosure 
requirements and mechanisms to be addressed in the framework of negotiations held 
in WIPO IGC. Established in 2001, the IGC received a renewed mandate by the 2009 
session of WIPO General Assemblies164 to continue its work and undertake text-based 
negotiations towards international legal instrument(s) which will ensure effective 
protection of genetic resources, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural 
expressions, ‘without prejudice to the work pursued in other fora’165 – such fora 
including in particular the TRIPS Council, other WIPO committees and bodies such 
as the Working Group on the Patent Cooperation Treaty,166 and arguably the CBD 
with regard to its ABS negotiations. It should be noted that the establishment of the 
IGC was a result of the influence of the CBD principles, as well as of developing 
countries’ concerns regarding the consequences of patents over their genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge, and inherent injustices enshrined in the intellectual 
property system.167   
The question of how to establish mechanisms or obligations that can capture ABS-
relevant benefits from the patent systems and channel them back to the country 
providing genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge thus remains open in 
various fora.168 Achieving consistency and mutual supportiveness across these 
different fora would ensure the effectiveness of benefit-sharing among States. For 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Ibid. 
164 Report of the 38th (19th Ordinary) session of the WIPO General Assembly (Geneva, 22 September 
– 1 October 2009, doc. WO/GA/38/20, 1 October 2009), para. 217.  
165 Ibid., para. 217. 
166 See the Swiss proposal for amending the PCT ‘Declaration of the source of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge in patent applications. Proposals submitted by Switzerland’, submitted at the 
ninth session of the Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (Geneva, 23-27 April 
2007, doc. PCT/R/WG/9/5, 7 March 2007).  
167 WIPO Secretariat, Matters concerning intellectual property and genetic resources, traditional 
knowledge and folklore (WO/GA/26/6, 25 August 2000), paras 1-2. 
168 R. Andersen et al., ‘International Agreements and processes affecting an international regime on 
ABS under CBD’, FNI Report 3.2010 (March 2010) at 34. 
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instance, while a stand-alone disclosure requirement in the future ABS regime might 
not be sufficient to achieve the inter-State benefit-sharing obligation, a more complete 
enforcement system making use also of the intellectual property system could assist in 
resolving the difficult technical and legal issues of the cross-border use of genetic 
resources.169 
WHO negotiations on viruses and vaccines 
WHO negotiations to increase equitable access to vaccines for highly pathogenic 
avian influenza A and pandemic 2009 influenza A over the past five years have 
evolved into a highly controversial area of global health diplomacy.170 In this context, 
vaccines are the benefits to be shared in return for access to viruses, to facilitate 
medical research. The debate has mirrored difficulties encountered in the CBD 
framework, as developing countries are concerned that their populations would not 
have access to influenza vaccines. Such concerns, and the lack of any mechanism to 
ensure equitable access to other benefits from research on influenza viruses, prompted 
Indonesia to refuse to share its H5N1 virus samples with the WHO.171 
The question of whether and to what extent the CBD applies to pathogens, and 
therefore whether the principle of national sovereignty should apply, remains open.172 
While application of the principle of national sovereignty in this case is generally not 
regarded as conducive to facilitating timely sharing of virus samples required to 
improve global health governance,173 pathogens used to develop vaccines and 
medicines are economic resources and could be covered by the commercial dimension 
of ABS. The issue was addressed in the CBD during deliberations on the scope of the 
international regime when developing countries sought to ensure that viruses and 
other pathogenic material would be covered by a future ABS framework, without 
reaching a solution.174 
The discontent of developing countries with the traditional global influenza 
strategy175 has led to a reform process under the WHO on the sharing of influenza 
viruses and on access to vaccines and other benefits. In 2007, a resolution was 
adopted176 which, using language clearly reflecting the influence of the CBD, urges 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Ibid., at 48. 
170 D. P. Fidler ‘Negotiating Equitable Access to Influenza Vaccines: Global Health Diplomacy and the 
Controversies Surrounding Avian Influenza H5N1 and Pandemic Influenza H1N1’ 7:5:1000247 PLoS 
Med (4 May 2010).  
171 Indonesia’s refusal to share its virus samples was based on CBD principles: it was argued that it had 
the right not to share the samples because it controlled access on samples collected in its territory, other 
Parties could not use them without their prior informed consent, and their use should result in benefits 
for Indonesia. See D. P. Fidler ‘Influenza virus samples, international and global health diplomacy’ 
14:1 Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2008, cited at R. Andersen et al., n. 168 above, at 40.  
172 R. Andersen et al., ibid., at 37. 
173 Ibid., at 37. 
174 C. Chiarolla, et al., ‘Summary of the seventh meeting of the Working Group on Access and Benefit-
sharing of the CBD, 2-8 April 2009’, 9:465 Earth Negotiations Bulletin (2009).   
175 Global influenza governance has operated in basically the same way for the past 50 years. Samples 
of new influenza viruses are analyzed by WHO laboratories, a WHO committee determines which 
strains are most likely to affect human beings, and manufacturers start making vaccines. Most of the 
250–300 million doses of vaccine made each year are used to vaccinate people in developed countries, 
even though the new influenza viruses often originate in developing countries, primarily in Asia. See 
R. Andersen et al., n. 168 above, at 38. 
176 See WHO resolution 60.28 (May 2007) on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: sharing of influenza 
viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits. 
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WHO member States to ensure and promote ‘transparent, fair and equitable sharing of 
the benefits arising from the generation of information, diagnostics, medicines, 
vaccines and other technologies.’ Subsequent intergovernmental meetings177 have 
worked on drafting a pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the sharing of 
viruses and access to vaccines, although significant areas remained unresolved.  
A clear case of inter-State benefit-sharing, the WHO debates see developed countries 
generally preferring voluntary benefit-sharing without links to the sharing of viruses 
and favouring the possibility of allowing patents to be claimed on material shared 
through the WHO and the resulting products.178 Most developing countries stress that 
those entities receiving material through the WHO should commit to benefit-sharing 
through a standard material transfer agreement, and do not wish to allow granting of 
intellectual property rights on the shared material itself, arguing that this should be 
allowed on the resulting product only if it is licensed to developing countries free of 
royalties.179 The latter argument clearly links granting of intellectual property rights to 
sharing of benefits. Furthermore, one can observe parallels with the ITPGR 
particularly with regard to the overall objectives pursued by each instrument – global 
health governance in one case, global food security in the other. The existence of such 
parallels indicates the potential usefulness for WHO of solutions adopted in the 
ITPGR framework.180 
REDD-plus 
Consideration of REDD-plus under the UNFCCC opens the door to possible 
international legal provisions on forest conservation and sustainable use with a view 
to mitigating climate change, as well as a Pandora’s Box of concerns to ensure that 
the other multiple values of forests are not overlooked, particularly those related to 
biodiversity and the livelihoods of forest-dependent indigenous and local 
communities.  
In 2007, this item was formally included in the UNFCCC negotiations by the Bali 
Action Plan, as consideration of ‘policy approaches and positive incentives on issues 
relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in 
developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Intergovernmental Meeting on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of Influenza Viruses and 
Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits, 20-23 November 2007, resumed in 15-16 May 2009. An 
intersessional working group met in April and December 2008. See the report by the WHO Secretariat 
to the 124th session of the WHO Executive Board ‘Pandemic influenza preparedness: sharing of 
influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits’ (27 November 2008, EB124/4) and the 
report by the WHO Secretariat to the 126th session of the WHO Executive Board ‘Pandemic influenza 
preparedness: sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits: outcome of the 
process to finalize remaining elements under the pandemic influenza preparedness framework for the 
sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits’ (10 December 2009, EB126/4).  
178 See the Intellectual Property Quarterly Update (South Centre and CIEL, Third Quarter 2009), at 10 
and the WHO Secretariat 2009 report, ibid, at 6.  
179 See Andersen et al., n. 168 above, at 40. For outstanding items, see WHO ‘Proposals to finalize 
remaining elements of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework for sharing influenza viruses 
and access to vaccines and other benefits’ (doc. WHO/HSE/GIP/PIP/2009.1, October 2009) and the 
WHO Secretariat 2009 report, n. 181 above. 
180 See in particular the report by the WHO Director-General, ‘Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: 
Sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits’ (A/PIP/IGM/13, 30 April 2009). 
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and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.’181 In addition, 
parties were encouraged to explore a range of actions, including demonstration 
activities, to address deforestation and forest degradation.182  
A link between CBD Article 8(j) and forest biodiversity has already been highlighted 
in the previous section, and its relevance for the international negotiations on REDD-
plus was specifically addressed by the CBD COP in 2008, which invited governments 
and international organizations to ensure that possible actions do not run counter to 
the CBD objectives, but provide benefits for forest biodiversity and to indigenous and 
local communities.183  
Negotiations on REDD-plus under the UNFCCC may concern both inter-State 
benefit-sharing, with regards to the question of whether public funding or market-
based mechanisms or a combination of both may be used to reward developing 
countries for their emission reductions,184 and State-to-community benefit-sharing, in 
so far as negotiations have focused on safeguards. While negotiations are mainly 
concerned with the former at this stage, it is worth remarking that questions of respect 
for traditional knowledge and participation of indigenous and local communities in 
REDD-plus have been mainly discussed in the context of social safeguards,185 without 
any specific reference to (State-to-community) benefit-sharing. Nonetheless, the close 
links between traditional knowledge, communities’ effective participation and 
possibly compensation for negative impacts deriving from REDD-plus actions may 
point in the direction of State-to-community benefit-sharing. And indeed legal 
literature anticipates that benefit-sharing will be part, or a result of, a future REDD-
plus international framework.186 
In this respect it is instructive that the pilot initiatives on REDD led by the UN 
System and the World Bank have already addressed benefit-sharing. The UN-REDD 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13 in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth 
session: Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties (FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 March 
2008), para. 1(b)(iii). 
182 Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action, 
Decision 2/CP.13, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session: Decisions 
adopted by the Conference of the Parties, ibid., para. 3. 
183 Incentive Measures (Article 11), CBD COP 9 Decision IX/6 (9 October 2008), para. 5. 
184 See, for instance, I. Fry, ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation: 
Opportunities and Pitfalls in Developing a New Legal Regime’, 17:2 RECIEL (2008), 166. 
185 The text resulting from negotiations in the Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action 
(Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention on its 
eighth session (FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/17, 5 February 2010), section G) at the Copenhagen Climate 
Change Conference in December 2009 contains language on respecting the knowledge and rights of 
indigenous peoples and members of local communities, by taking into account relevant international 
obligations, national circumstances and laws; full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, 
including in particular indigenous peoples and local communities in REDD actions; and ensuring that 
REDD actions are used to enhance social and environmental benefits. Another portion of text provides 
that developing countries developing and implementing their national strategy or action plan on REDD 
ensure the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples and local communities in addressing 
drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, land tenure issues, forest governance issues, gender 
considerations and safeguards. 
186 See, for instance, K. Graham and A. Thorpe, ‘Community-based Monitoring, Reporting and 
Verification of REDD Projects: Innovative Potentials for Benefit-Sharing’ 3:3 Climate and Carbon 
Law Review (2009), 303; and J. Costenbader, ‘Benefit-sharing’, in J. Costenbader (ed.) Legal 
Frameworks for REDD: Design and Implementation at the National Level, IUCN Environmental 
Policy and Law Paper No. 77 (IUCN,  2010), at 57-80.  
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Programme, the United Nations Collaborative initiative on Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries,187 adopted in 2009 its 
‘Operational Guidance: Engagement of Indigenous Peoples and Other Forest 
Dependent Communities’,188 which refers to the obligations stemming from CBD 
Article 8(j) as providing guidance and overarching principles for engagement with 
indigenous peoples based on a human rights-based approach.189 It further identifies 
relevant provisions of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the 
context of REDD and provides a detailed discussion of how free prior informed 
consent relates to REDD activities, including the need for ‘a preliminary assessment 
of likely economic, social, cultural and environmental impacts, including potential 
risks and fair and equitable benefit-sharing in a context that respects the precautionary 
principle,’ based on the CBD Akwé: Kon voluntary guidelines.190 It is also noted that 
failure to use these guidelines could raise ‘serious questions as to [whether the] 
environmental and social impact assessment conforms to international best practice 
and standards.’191 Finally, the guidelines call for participation also in benefit-sharing 
and in the establishment of REDD payment distribution.192  
The World Bank’s ‘Forest Carbon Partnership Facility’ published in 2009 a guidance 
document on ‘National Consultations and Participation for REDD’,193 which adopts 
pragmatic – rather than human rights-based – language, calling for prior informed 
‘consultation and participation’ in order to elaborate more effective and more 
sustainable policies and programmes.194 This terminology is based on the Bank’s 
Operational Guidelines (OP) 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples,195 which require ‘prior, 
informed consultation’ as a fundamental step in the planning and implementation of 
projects financed by the World Bank that may affect indigenous peoples, as well as 
that ‘Indigenous Peoples receive social and economic benefits that are culturally 
appropriate and gender and inter-generationally inclusive.’196  For present purposes, it 
should be noted that the guidance document refers both to the ‘equitable and effective 
distribution of REDD revenues’197 and to guaranteeing the equitable share of REDD 
benefits with stakeholders affected vis-à-vis REDD strategies, particularly poor and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 The Programme was launched in 2008 to assist developing countries prepare and implement 
national REDD+ strategies by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP). See ‘About the UN-REDD Programme’ (undated) found at < http://www.un-
redd.org/AboutUNREDDProgramme/tabid/583/language/en-US/Default.aspx>. 
188 UN REDD Programme, Operational Guidance: Engagement of Indigenous Peoples and Other Forest 
Dependent Communities (UN REDD Programme, March 2009), found at  <http://www.un-
redd.org/Portals/15/documents/events/20090309Panama/Documents/UN%20REDD%20IP%20Guideli
nes%2023Mar09.pdf>. 
189 Ibid., at 5. 
190 Ibid., at 7. 
191 Ibid., at 14. 
192 Ibid., at 12. 
193 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, National Consultations and Participation for REDD (Note FMT 
2009-2, 6 May 2009), found at 
<http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/F
CPF_FMT_Note_2009-2_Consult_Particip_Guidance_05-06-09_0.pdf>. 
194 Ibid., at 2-3. 
195 World Bank, Operational Policies (OP) 4.10 – Indigenous Peoples (July 2005), found at 
<http://go.worldbank.org/UBJJIRUDP0>.   
196 Ibid., para. 1. 
197 See Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, n. 193 above, at 7 [(emphasis added]).  
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marginalized groups.198 This ambiguous choice of terms seems to leave open the 
question of whether non-economic benefits arising from REDD activities will also 
come into play.  
It remains to be seen, therefore, whether State-to-community benefit-sharing will play 
a significant role in international or national law on REDD-plus, as a reward for 
forest-related traditional knowledge, as an incentive for communities’ participation in 
REDD+ activities, or as compensation for negative impacts of REDD-plus activities 
on forest-dependent indigenous and local communities, building on the guidance and 
tools developed under the CBD.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The developments under the CBD have progressively clarified that inter-State and 
State-to-community benefit-sharing may contribute in different ways and under 
different conditions to communities’ livelihoods, as well as have a bearing on other 
global processes. Given the fact that the CBD Secretariat and CBD Parties are 
becoming more and more aware of the need to demonstrate the relevance of the 
Convention to global development and human well-being,199 efforts are now needed to 
fully implement benefit-sharing with a view to effectively supporting sustainable 
development and equity.  
With specific regard to inter-State benefit-sharing related to access to genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge, enactment of national legislation should be 
accompanied by a system involving an international ABS regime and an amendment 
to the intellectual property rights architecture, in combination with a compliance and 
enforcement system, to deal with cross-border movements of genetic resources and 
development of products based on genetic resources and traditional knowledge. 
Consistency among the different international fora working in the field is thus critical. 
Against this background, specific legal tools are needed to ensure that benefits reach 
the community level and reward indigenous peoples and local communities for their 
stewardship.  
Work on State-to-community benefit-sharing with regard to the CBD conservation 
and sustainable use objectives also needs to be intensified. The overall picture of 
procedural requirements that emerges from various COP decisions must be reflected 
systematically in national legislation, to ensure that benefits arising from the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity reach indigenous and local 
communities in recognition of their traditional knowledge contributions, as an 
incentive for their participation in decision-making and as compensation for negative 
impacts arising from priority conservation measures, ultimately facilitating 
compliance with the law.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Ibid., at 8. 
199 On the links between biodiversity and human wellbeing, see Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 
Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Biodiversity synthesis (World Resources Institute, 2005). 
Following the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report, work on biodiversity and development has 
intensified in the CBD framework, inter alia with the launch of the Biodiversity for Development 
Initiative in 2008, which focuses on the role biodiversity can play for poverty alleviation and 
development. It should also be noted that the theme of the 2010 International Biodiversity Day is 
‘Biodiversity for Development and Poverty Alleviation.’ See CBD Secretariat, Biodiversity, 
Development and Poverty Alleviation: Recognizing the role of biodiversity for human well-being 
(CBD, 2009).  
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The fragmentation of the CBD processes, resulting in a myriad of overlapping COP 
decisions, however, may have obscured the significant evolution of benefit-sharing 
and its overall coherence. This is not only an obstacle for law-makers involved in the 
implementation of the Convention at the national level, but also for negotiators 
willing to ensure mutual supportiveness with the Convention in other international 
processes. It may also be a hindrance to private sector entities involved in the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity on the ground, and to international 
and national adjudicators willing to uphold a community human rights-based 
approach to environmental protection.200 
 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the legal and conceptual differences between inter-State 
and State-to-community dimension of benefit-sharing, the urgent need for an 
integrative interpretation and application of the text of the Convention and its COP 
decisions cannot be over-estimated to achieving the CBD’s three objectives in a 
mutually reinforcing way. The conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity are 
essential to preserve the genetic variability that serves to address new and pressing 
human needs, while the economic revenue generated by the access to and 
development of genetic resources can significantly contribute to conservation 
objectives. These reciprocal linkages appear even more evident in the light of the 
every-day interactions of local and indigenous communities with biodiversity in its 
genetic, species and ecosystem dimensions, and the inter-dependence between 
communities’ socio-cultural diversity and biodiversity.201  
 
At the time of concluding this article, the third edition of the Global Biodiversity 
Outlook202 confirmed the failure of the international community to reach the target to 
reduce significantly the rate of biodiversity loss by 2010.203 The report acknowledges, 
not surprisingly, that effectively addressing biodiversity loss depends on tackling the 
underlying causes or indirect drivers of that decline, including ‘ensuring that the 
benefits arising from use of and access to genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge, for example through the development of drugs and cosmetics, are 
equitably shared with the countries and cultures from which they are obtained.’204 
Now that the target has been missed, empowering indigenous peoples and local 
communities to effectively contribute to the implementation of the Convention on 
Biodiversity in a true partnership with States and private entities is more urgently 
needed than ever. 
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200 As opposed to an individualistic human rights-based approach, see F. Francioni, ‘International 
Human Rights in an Environmental Horizon’, 21:1 European Journal of International Law (2010), 41. 
201 See generally R. Jayakumar Nayar and D Ong, ‘Developing Countries, ‘Development’ and the 
Conservation of Biological Diversity’, in Bowman and Redgwell, n. 5 above, 235-254. 
202 CBD Secretariat, Global Biodiversity Outlook 3 (CBD, 2010). 
203 Ibid., at 9. 
204 Ibid., at 12. 
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